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Abstract 
This dissertation advances our understanding of the way that individuals 
think about and respond to natural and anthropogenic disasters. I accomplish this 
by way of theoretical specification and empirical testing. With respect to theory, I 
build upon recent research on the relationship between affect, risk, and decision-
making to hypothesize that the specific emotions (i.e., fear, anger, sadness) that 
individuals experience when confronted with a crisis or disaster orient the way in 
which they think about and respond to the situation. Moreover, I propose that the 
specific emotions people experience in response to a crisis or disaster are not 
entirely stochastic; rather, different groups of people are predisposed to 
experience different emotions when encountering the same situation.  
After deriving these propositions from the literature I subject them to 
empirical testing by asking survey respondents to think about and respond to a 
hypothetical disaster wherein the United States suffers a devastating nuclear 
attack. In all, I find evidence in support of three propositions: 1) affect influences 
the way in which people think about disasters; 2) discrete emotions of the same 
valence (like anger, sadness, and fear) differentially impact individual responses 
to disasters; 3) different groups of people (as defined by shared cultural and socio-
biological attributes) are predisposed to experience different emotions when given 
the same information about a crisis or disaster.   
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Chapter 1: Individual Responses to Crises and Disasters 
    
  1.1: Introduction 
On May 22, 2011, one of the most devastating tornadoes in US history 
killed 159 people and injured thousands of others in Joplin, MO. According to the 
National Weather Service (National Weather Service 2011), this storm was a 
“warned” disaster in that the residents of Joplin received advance notice—via 
repeated tornado sirens— and critical information about the impending severe 
weather prior to the arrival of the tornado. Fortunately, a large fraction of Joplin 
residents reacted to these warnings by immediately seeking shelter. Others reacted 
by seeking additional information about the approaching storm (i.e., TV, radio, or 
Internet updates). A third subset of residents, by contrast, received the same set of 
warnings, but decided not to react. In other words, post-storm interviews indicate 
that this group of people received the same information (warning signals) but 
made different decisions about how to respond (National Weather Service 2011). 
The decisions that people made on that afternoon were extremely consequential—
in some instances, unfortunately, making the difference between life and death. 
In a broad sense, this dissertation attempts to explain why people make the 
decisions they do when confronted with information about a crisis or disaster. 
Why, for example, did some residents of Joplin seek shelter whereas others 
decided to ignore the tornado warnings? 
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1.2: Previous Research 
Systematic research on individual responses to disasters began in the early 
1950s when a relatively small group of researchers (primarily sociologists and 
psychologists) were commissioned by the US military to study the way in which 
US residents respond to disasters. These studies were undertaken because the 
military was worried that the public would resort to an uncontrollable state of 
panic and flight if a war was initiated on the mainland (Quarantelli 1987). 
Fortunately, war does not occur very frequently, so the military—by extension of 
this group of researchers—directed their study towards other sorts of “peacetime” 
disasters. Between 1950-1954, for example, a team of social scientists associated 
with the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago 
inventoried individual behavior at eight different disaster sites, ranging from an 
earthquake in Bakersfield, CA, a tornado in White County, AR, to airplane 
crashes in Elizabeth, NJ and Flagler, CO (e.g., Fritz and Marks 1954; Bucher 
1957; and Quarantelli 1960).1 Though each of these studies yielded a slightly 
different set of insights, their cumulative finding was rather clear—the panic, 
flight, and other types of uncontrolled asocial behavior (like exploitation and 
looting) that the military was worried about is relatively uncommon. 
Having dispelled this myth, the growing group of scholars interested in 
individual responses to disaster began documenting other sorts of behavior, which 
again, contradicted conventional wisdom of the time. For instance, researchers 
                                                
1 For a thoughtful review of this research, see Quarantelli 1987.  
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repeatedly witnessed “convergence behavior” in the immediate aftermath of 
disasters wherein concerned citizens migrated towards rather than away from the 
area that was impacted (e.g., Fritz and Mathewson 1957).2 Similarly, scholars 
observed high levels social solidarity and altruistic behavior before, during, and 
after disasters (e.g., Fritz 1961; Wilmer 1958; Barton 1969).3 Again, this account 
of individual behavior during crises reaffirmed the notion that individuals are not 
the self-interested and mindless beings that the military was worried about. 
Nevertheless, early research on individual reactions to disasters identified a 
number of anomalies that led some scholars to question public “rationality.” Most 
notably, researchers found that large portions of the public took little if any 
precautionary/protective action to mitigate the impact of disasters as they 
approached (e.g., Blum and Klass 1956; Lachman, Tatsuoka, and Bonk 1961; 
Williams 1964). This observation persisted even if the victims received advanced 
warning of the disaster (Fritz and Marks 1954).  
 As the 1950-1960s waned, puzzling findings such as these stimulated a 
new era of disaster research, wherein scholars spent less time describing public 
responses to crises and more time answering specific questions about why 
individuals respond to disasters in different ways. In other words, description 
                                                
2 For subsequent research on convergence behavior, see Scanlon 1992 and 
Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001. 
3 For subsequent research on altruistic behavior during and after disasters, see 
Dynes, Quarantelli, and Wenger 1990, O’Brien and Mileti 1992, and Mileti 1999. 
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gave way to causal inference, as social scientists sought to better explain variation 
in inter-individual decision-making during disasters. Research of this type tended 
to focus on the most basic decisions that individuals face in the moments leading 
up to a disaster, like whether or not they should evacuate. In their initial attempts 
to address these kinds of questions (the late 60’s – early 70’s), scholars advanced 
and tested hundreds of hypotheses about the various factors that might impact 
decisions to evacuate. 
Over time, scholars subjected these hypotheses to repeated tests in order to 
derive a theoretically and empirically refined list of the variables that influence 
decision-making during disasters. For example, Baker (1979) waded through a 
pool of 75 variables to find that the most consistent predictors of hurricane 
evacuation (across multiple storms) were expectation of damage and residential 
location. People who were convinced that the incoming storm would produce 
dangerous wind speeds and storm surges tended to evacuate whereas the people 
who thought the storm would be less severe tended to stay in their homes. In other 
words, individuals were more likely to evacuate if they believed that the warning 
they received was valid. Second, evacuation was more common in lower 
elevations near the ocean, suggesting that individuals who live in these areas 
recognized the increased vulnerability and acted accordingly. In a separate study, 
Perry (1979) sorted his way through a mound of empirical evidence to come up 
with a similar set of conclusions. Decisions about evacuation, he found, are 
impacted by two individual-level factors—calculations about whether or not a 
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threat is “real” and individualized assessments of risk (Perry 1979).  Based on this 
finding, he argued that people ask themselves two questions when deciding how 
to respond to the incoming storm—is the warning credible and how likely is it 
that they (or their families) will be impacted? 
In the 30+ years since these studies were published, Baker, Perry, and a 
variety of other scholars have continued to study individual-level decision-making 
during disasters (e.g., Baker 1988; 1991; Lindell and Perry 1992). In so doing, 
they have branched out from early studies of hurricane evacuation to different 
types of natural and man-caused disasters as well as different types of 
precautionary actions. Likewise, researchers have used multiple sources of 
information including surveys, in-depth interviews, and experiments to better 
explain variation in individual decision-making during disasters. Because of this 
collective research endeavor, most researchers would agree that we now have a 
relatively small list of factors that consistently impact decision-making during 
disasters. As summarized by Mileti and Sorensen (1990), Whitehead, Edwards, 
Van Willigen, Maiolo, Wilson, and Smith (2000), and many others, the factors 
that top this list can be grouped into three categories: information inputs (disaster 
warnings), perceived credibility and accuracy of information (including warning 
systems), and individual assessments of risk.4 With respect to information, for 
example, repeated studies have shown that people who hear about a disaster prior 
                                                
4 For other summaries of this literature, see Lindell and Perry 1992, Sorensen 
2000, Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001.   
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to its occurrence (e.g., a warning was issued and they received it) and trust that 
the information they receive is credible tend to take more precautionary actions 
than people who do not receive or trust this information. Likewise, individuals 
who judge that a disaster directly threatens their health, safety, or property are 
more likely to take precautionary action than those who perceive lower levels of 
personal risk. 
Based on these findings, we can start to answer the questions about 
individual decision-making during the Joplin disaster that motivated this chapter. 
For instance, when deciding whether or not to seek shelter as the storm 
approached, residents of Joplin explicitly or implicitly engaged in a set of 
questions and calculations that looked something like this:   
1) Did I hear the warning?  
2) [If yes] Is the warning credible? (Or do I think it is a false alarm?) 
3) [If yes] How likely is it that a tornado will touch down at my current 
location? 
4) [If deemed likely] If a tornado does touch down at my currently location, 
how much damage will it do? 
If previous research is correct, the residents that answered no to questions 1 
and/or 2 probably decided not to seek shelter. The group of residents that 
answered yes to questions 1 and/or 2, most likely went on to answer questions 3 
and 4 about the relative risk (probability and consequences) of a tornado 
impacting them. All else equal, the people that perceived relatively low levels of 
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personal risk were less likely to take precautionary action (seek shelter) than the 
group of people who perceived high levels of risk.5 
Though explanations like this—which are prominently featured in a 
number of post-disaster reports (including the National Weather Service report on 
Joplin and the “historic” Tornados of April 2011)—provide valuable insight into 
the way in which some individuals respond to disasters, I argue in this dissertation 
that these explanations tell only half the story. They overlook the possibility that 
affect and emotion, rather than (or in addition to) “rational” calculation based on 
systematic reasoning influence the way in which individuals think about and 
respond to disasters. Is it possible, for example, that some portion of Joplin 
residents sought shelter because they were more frightened by the possibility of a 
tornado than were other residents? What about apathy and frustration—how 
might these emotions have influenced individual decisions about what to do upon 
receiving the tornado warning? Unfortunately, we are (as yet) unable to answer 
questions of this sort because the story told by extant research on individual 
reasoning about crises and disasters incomplete.  
  
1.3: Overview of the Dissertation 
In a broad sense, this dissertation marks an initial attempt to rectify this 
theoretical lacuna by telling the affect side of the story. To accomplish this, the 
                                                
5 The National Weather Service’s “after-action” assessment of the Joplin tornado 
(National Weather Service 2011) reveals partial support for these propositions.  
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remaining sections of the dissertation proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I borrow 
from research on risk and decision science to provide a short review of the 
literature on affect and decision-making. In so doing, I highlight the theoretical 
and empirical progress that scholars have made on this front and discuss a number 
of areas that require more research. Based on this discussion, I then propose a 
more complete model of human responses to crises and disasters that incorporates 
the role of emotion. From there I move on to Chapter 3, wherein I describe and 
empirically validate my approach to measuring emotion, which is a necessary first 
step in testing the model I propose. Along the way, I highlight the extent to which 
different people experience different types—and levels—of discrete emotion 
(fear, anger, and sadness) when given the same information regarding a crisis or 
disaster. I then move on to Chapter 4, which is motivated by a relatively 
straightforward follow-up question: do these differences matter? In other words, 
do discrete emotions of the same valance—like anger, fear, and sadness—
differentially influence the individual reasoning about and respond to crises and 
disasters? After that, I proceed to Chapter 5, where I focus on an important yet 
understudied question in the literature—are the discrete emotions that individuals 
experience when contemplating a crisis or disaster randomly distributed across the 
population, or are certain groups predisposed to experience specific kinds of 
emotions when responding to different types crises and/or disasters? Chapter 6 
concludes the dissertation with a brief summary of my findings and a discussion 
about the theoretical and practical implications of my work as well as some 
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remarks about directions for future research. 
As a brief prelude to this discussion, it is important to note that this 
dissertation draws upon research from a variety of fields (i.e., social psychology 
and risk analysis) to achieve the essential yet intermediate goal of advancing our 
understanding of the way that individuals think about and respond to natural and 
anthropogenic disasters. The more important and ultimate goal of this research is 
to improve our capacity (as a society) to protect life and property by minimizing 
the impact of crises and disasters. Doing so, however, requires that policymakers 
design programs and communication strategies that are sensitive to and reflect the 
nuances of human cognition and behavior. This is exceedingly difficult if (as 
argued above) policymakers overlook or misunderstand the critical role that 
emotion plays in these processes. Thus, while I borrow from and contribute to 
research in other fields, this dissertation is firmly rooted in the interdisciplinary 
field of public policy, which (among other things) “speaks truth to power” by 
providing policymakers with the information they need to manage risk in a 
complex and uncertain world.      
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Chapter 2: Emotion and Decision-Making 
  
2.1: The State of the Literature 
Psychologists have long recognized that human decision-making and 
behavior are governed by a dual-process wherein affective experience and 
analytical reasoning interact to influence thinking, knowing, and information 
processing (e.g., Epstein 1994; Sloman 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and 
Welch 2001; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Kahneman 2003). Analytical reasoning 
characterizes the slow, systematic, deliberative, and effortful process by which 
people “rationally” sort through information to determine which decision or 
behavior maximizes their goals or preferences. Classic exercises like cost vs. 
benefit analysis or the weighing of pros and cons when making a decision provide 
some examples of analytical reasoning. Anyone that has engaged in these 
exercises understands that this sort of reasoning can be effortful and slow. 
Affective cognition, by contrast, denotes the relatively fast, automatic, 
intuitive, and effortless process by which people—consciously or 
unconsciously—draw upon their emotions or feelings when deciding what to do 
in a given situation. Decisions that are made based upon “gut feelings”, for 
example, represent one form of affective cognition. Again, anyone that has 
engaged in this sort of reasoning recognizes that is relatively fast and easy in that 
it requires little if any external information or systematic thought. 
Though debate persists about the symbiotic relationship between these 
processes, the majority of biological, cognitive, and social psychologists agree 
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that many—perhaps even the majority—of decisions that humans make are 
influenced if not determined by some form of affective cognition (e.g., Schwartz 
and Clore 1988; Zajonc 1998; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). This is especially 
likely, scientists say, when people have to make quick decisions in situations 
imbued with uncertainty (e.g., LeDoux 1996).   
Despite early and widespread agreement among psychologists, decision 
scientists have been somewhat hesitant to incorporate affect into models of 
judgment and decision-making (Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch 2001). 
Instead, mainstream risk and decision research in the 1970s and 1980s (like 
contemporary disaster research), tended to focus on analytical reasoning and/or 
the set of heuristics and cognitive biases that interrupt and misdirect individual 
pursuit of expected utility (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).  
This began to change in the 1990s when Paul Slovic and his colleagues 
commenced their work on the relationship between imagery, affect, stigma, and 
decision-making (for examples of this work, see Flynn, Slovic, and Kunreuther 
2001). In their first study, for example, Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, 
and Gesell (1991) found that affectively charged mental images influence 
decisions about where to vacation, relocate, and retire. All else equal, people are 
more likely to visit/reside in a location they associate with positive images. After 
that, Slovic and his colleagues extended their work on affect-laden mental images 
to a wide variety of judgments, decisions, and behaviors, including individual 
perceptions of the risks and benefits of nuclear power (Alhakami and Slovic 
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1994), adolescent decisions to smoke (Benthin, Slovic, Moran, Severson, Mertz, 
and Gerrard 1995), and individual support and opposition to new technologies 
(Peters and Slovic 1996). 
As these results accumulated, Slovic and his collaborators noticed a more 
general pattern, wherein individuals regularly use feelings as a substitute or 
shortcut for analytical reasoning when making decisions. Giving name to this 
recognition, they began calling this pattern of reasoning the “affect heuristic” 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2007). In short form, decision-making 
by way of the affect heuristic looks something like this:6  
1. An individual encounters a stimulus (e.g., an event, technology, 
hazard, image, narrative, etc.) 
2. The stimulus evokes a “pool” of positive (good) and/or negative (bad) 
feelings 
3. The individual consciously or unconsciously draws from this pool of 
affective information when making a decision about how to respond to 
the stimulus. 
Since then, theorists have used the affect heuristic to predict and explain 
an impressive variety of decisions and behaviors in a number of substantive 
domains, ranging from decisions about charitable giving (Small, Loewenstein, 
                                                
6 Slovic and his colleagues’ notion of an “affect-heuristic” is quite similar to the 
“affect-as-information” model that was originally developed by Schwartz and 
Clore (1983).  
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and Slovic 2007), sensitivity to mass tragedies like genocide (Slovic 2010), and 
perceptions of environmental risk (Slovic and Slovic 2005; Leiserowitz 2005; 
2006), to investment behavior (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, and 
Damasio 2005), judgments about the probability of terrorism (Sunstein 2003), and 
opinions about political leaders, events, and issues (Lodge and Taber 2005). 
Based on this growing body of research, a considerable number of 
decision theorists now agree that emotion plays an important role in human 
judgment and decision-making. For example, noted theorist and Nobel laureate 
Daniel Kahneman referred to research on affect and decision-making as “the most 
important development in the study of judgment heuristics in the past few 
decades” (2003, 710). The current editors of Risk Analysis (the flagship journal 
for the Society for Risk Analysis) would probably agree with his assessment, as 
approximately half of the 20 most cited articles in the journal focus on the 
relationship between affect, risk perceptions, and human behavior (Greenberg, 
Haas, Cox, Lowrie, McComas, and North 2012). In light of this agreement, 
affective processes are prominently featured in most, if not all, “state of the art” 
models of human judgment, decision-making, and behavior (e.g., Kahneman 
2011; Manktelow 2012; Holyoak and Morrison 2012).  
  
2.2: Controversies and Empirical Soft Spots in the Literature 
Valence-Based vs. Emotion-Specific Approaches 
Despite this broad agreement, research on the role of affect in decision-
14 
 
making is relatively immature. As recognized by Slovic and Peters (2006), our 
theories are fragmented and overly simplistic. Likewise, the pool of empirical 
evidence that scholars have mounted in support of their theories is broadening, 
but remains relatively shallow. As a result, there are a number of theoretical 
controversies and empirical soft spots7 within the literature in need of resolution 
and/or fortification. 
One of the most prominent controversies involves the distinction between 
valence-based and emotion-specific approaches to the study of affect and 
decision-making. Advocates of valence-based approaches—like the affect 
heuristic—argue that the positive or negative valence (e.g., hedonic pleasantness 
vs. unpleasantness) that individuals associate with their feelings is the most 
significant if not only piece of information they use when engaged in affective 
processing. In other words, global assessments of positive or negative affect drive 
human judgment and decision-making, rather than more specific emotions like 
anger, fear, sadness, and/or happiness. In partial support of this claim, scholars 
have amassed mounds of empirical support for the relatively general proposition 
that negative emotions (regardless of their type) elicit pessimistic expectations 
about the future, whereas positive emotions bring about relatively optimistic 
expectations (see Forgas 2003 for reviews). 
Though parsimonious, critics argue that this approach confounds 
                                                
7 An “empirical soft spot” is a portion of the literature where theory has outpaced 
empirical testing. 
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“common sense” and current research by implying that discrete emotions of the 
same valence, like sadness, anger, and fear, exert analogous influences on human 
thinking, preferences, decision-making, and behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000). 
Almost anyone that has experienced this mix of emotions, they argue, could tell 
you that anger, fear, and sadness “feel” different. In line with this insight, current 
research in psychology and neuroscience indicates that sadness, anger, fear, and 
other basic emotions differ in their antecedent appraisals (e.g., Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985), facial expressions (Izard 1971; Ekman 1994), and physiological 
reactions (Panksepp 1982; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990), despite their 
common valence. Given these differences, one would expect that discrete 
emotions of the same valence like sadness, anger, and fear, differentially impact 
human thinking, preferences, decision-making, and behavior. 
Motivated by this recognition, a number of decision theorists have moved 
“beyond valence” to develop and test theories about affect and decision-making 
that explicitly incorporate the idea that discrete emotions of the same valance may 
have a different effect on human thinking, preferences, decision-making, and 
behavior (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994; Lerner and Keltner 
2000, 2001; DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, and Rucker 2000; Lerner, Small, and 
Lowenstein 2004; Small and Lerner 2008). Most notably, Jennifer Lerner and her 
colleagues have developed and tested a theory they call the Appraisal-Tendency 
Framework (ATF) (Lerner and Keltner 2000). Inspired by research on cognitive-
appraisal theory (Smith and Ellsworth 1985), the ATF argues that the events, 
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actions, and other stimuli that individuals encounter elicit a set of cognitive 
appraisals8—i.e., valence, certainty, responsibility, control—that trigger specific 
emotions which, although biologically tailored to help humans respond to the 
stimuli that evoked the initial appraisals/emotions, often persist beyond the 
eliciting situation to influence human judgment and behavior.  
Anger, for example, arises from negative appraisals of (a) the 
responsibility of “other(s)” rather than the “self” for an unwanted or harmful 
situation, coupled with (b) a strong sense that individuals have control over the 
situation, and (c) a high degree of certainty about what caused the situation and 
what the result of that situation will be (e.g., Averill 1983; Betancourt and Blair 
1992; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Fear, by contrast, is triggered by (a) intense 
uncertainty about (b) an unwanted or harmful situation (in the present and in the 
future), combined with (c) a sense that the situation is beyond individual control 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985). From a functional (evolutionary) perspective, the set 
of appraisals associated with anger prepare an individual to remove or attack the 
agent responsible for the situation (Izard 1977). By comparison, the pattern of 
appraisals associated with fear prepares a person to escape or avoid an unwanted 
or harmful situation. In other words, anger prepares the body to fight whereas fear 
prepares for flight, and the ATF argues that the set of appraisals associated with 
                                                
8 For original expressions of appraisal theory, see Frijda (1986), Scherer (1984), 
and Smith and Ellsworth (1985). For useful reviews of this literature, see Scherer, 
Schorr, and Johnstone (2001) and Ellsworth and Scherer (2003). 
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these emotions carryover to motivate judgment and decision in a manner that is 
consistent with these action tendencies.  
In recent years, scholars have amassed a large and growing body of 
evidence that supports the AFT and emotion-specific approaches more broadly. 
For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) found that fear inflates and anger deflates 
perceptions of risk. Adding to this, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that angry 
people tend to be optimistic about future risks whereas fearful individuals tend 
towards pessimism. In the same study, they also found that angry people are 
“risk-seeking” in that they tend to take risks when given the opportunity whereas 
fearful people are “risk-adverse” in that they avoid risk when possible. Having 
examined the differential impact of fear and anger on risk perceptions and 
decision-making, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) then turned to 
the relationship between emotions and preferences about how the government 
should deal with a specific kind of risk— that of terrorism. Upon doing so, they 
found that angry individuals tend to support vengeful policies whereas individuals 
that experience heightened levels of fear generally support more 
precautionary/conciliatory policies. 
Despite these interesting and important findings, emotion-specific studies 
of affect and decision-making are vastly outnumbered by the exponentially 
increasing set of valance-based studies that populate mainstream journals in the 
field. Thus, the jury is still out about which approach better characterizes the way 
in which people think about and respond to the myriad of situations they face in 
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everyday life. More research is necessary if we want to solve this important 
debate. 
 
Individual Differences 
An even thinner spot in the literature involves our understanding of 
individual-level variation in affective responses to the same stimuli. Why is it, for 
example, that technologies like nuclear energy elicit positive images and feelings 
in some portions of the population and negative images and emotions in other 
portions of the population? Why does the thought of terrorism scare some groups 
of people and anger or sadden others?  
With a few notable exceptions, risk and decisions-theorists have been 
relatively silent on this question.9 In the few spots where scholars have implicitly 
addressed this issue, they suggest that emotional experience is governed by 
exposure to information (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson 2000). 
People experience different emotions because they are exposed to different 
information. Nuclear energy, for example, elicits positive images in some portions 
of the population and negative images in other portions of the population because 
people are exposed to different sorts of information about the technology. Those 
that are exposed to positive information experience positive affect whereas the 
portions of the population that are exposed to negative information tend to 
                                                
9 This research is rather scant in psychology as well. For a useful review, of the 
literature that does exist, see van Reekum and Scherer (1997).  
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experience negative feelings when thinking about nuclear energy (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson 2000). 
Though important, the aforementioned account is unable to explain 
differences among individuals that are exposed to (or have access to) the same set 
of information. Accordingly, Jenkins-Smith (2001) offers an updated model based 
on the idea that human beings are endowed with a fairly complex set of “filters” 
that direct our attention to certain types of information and away from other types 
of information.10 By implication, people with different filters may be exposed to 
the same set of information, but focus on different subsets of that information that 
elicit different appraisals, and consequently, different emotional experiences. 
Thus, if we want to understand individual differences with respect to emotional 
experiences, we have to understand the different sets of cognitive filters that 
direct individual attention. 
  
Cultural Worldviews 
Jenkins-Smith (2001) found that cultural worldviews represent one such 
filter that varies systematically across individuals. Though culture is a multi-
dimensional concept defined by a myriad of individual experiences, Jenkins-
Smith follows the work that Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, and other “Cultural 
Theorists” in defining culture according to individual preferences with respect to 
                                                
10 In some ways, this process is the affective analogue to confirmation bias, which 
effects analytical reasoning. 
20 
 
social interaction (e.g., Douglas 1970, 1982; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
More specifically, Cultural Theory (CT) argues that worldviews—and the 
biases that flow from them—are determined by individual orientations with 
respect to two dimensions of social interaction, group and grid.11 The group 
dimension captures the degree to which a person identifies with a bounded unit or 
social group. At the low end of the group continuum, people stand outside group 
boundaries and are identified (by themselves and others) as autonomous actors 
who (for better or worse) are dependent upon their own devices. Individuals at the 
high end of the group continuum, by comparison, define themselves according to 
their group affiliations and allow the group to guide (and, in the extreme, 
determine) what they do and when they do it.  
The grid dimension denotes the degree to which a person’s life—including 
their relationships with others—is defined by externally imposed rules and 
regulations. Individuals at the low end of the grid continuum prefer few (if any) 
societally imposed limits (or rules) on how their relationships are to be transacted. 
At the high end of the grid continuum, by contrast, people prefer that their 
interactions with others be regulated by authoritative rules and guidance.  
                                                
11 The theoretical and empirical literature on CT is vast. As such, this section 
provides an abbreviated overview of the theory. For a more complete description, 
see Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Ellis 
and Thompson 1997; and Swedlow 2002; 2011. 
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When these two dimensions are overlaid, they produce a finite set of four 
cultural worldviews—hierarchism, individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism. In 
order to justify, preserve, and strive towards achieving their preferred “way of 
life” the individuals that subscribe to one of the four worldviews adopt a multi-
dimensional bundle of normative and ontological beliefs that, in turn, filter the 
way in which individuals perceive, experience, and interpret the world around 
them: (Douglas 1982; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Coyle and Ellis 1994).12 
Among other things, these bundles contain individual beliefs (or myths) about 
human nature and the relative importance of basic values such as equality, liberty, 
and security. 
Hierarchs prefer strong group attachments and binding external 
prescriptions (high group, high grid). They place substantial weight on the welfare 
of the group and are keenly aware of whether other individuals are members of 
the group or outsiders. Likewise, they place great value on procedures, lines of 
authority, social stability, tradition, and order. Because of this, hierarchs are 
constantly scanning their environment for risks that threaten the traditions, 
organization, and/or security of their group, like abortion (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, 
                                                
12 Consistent with the vast majority of empirical studies that use CT, the theory 
presented in this dissertation explicitly assumes that cultural worldviews are latent 
predispositions that exist within individuals. It is important to note, however, that 
some advocates of CT argue that worldviews inhibit institutions, not people (e.g., 
Rayner 1992).  
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Slovic, and Mertz 2007), terrorism (Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and Herron 2011), 
and the HPV vaccine (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil, and Slovic 2010). 
Individualists, by comparison, tend to attach little if any weight to group 
affiliation and are loath to except externally defined prescriptions (low group, low 
grid). They prefer a society with few rules and regulations, which allows them to 
bid, bargain, and negotiate their way through life. Because of this, individualists 
look out for risks that threaten industry, commerce, and/or individual liberty, like 
environmental regulations (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) or homeland security 
policies that infringe upon individual privacy (Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and 
Herron 2011).  
Egalitarians seek strong group identities but prefer minimal prescriptions 
imposed from outside the group (high group, low grid). They reject differentiation 
on the basis of status and believe that everyone in the group should be treated 
equally. Because of this, egalitarians are particularly attentive to risks that 
threaten equality and the collective welling being of the group (now and in the 
future), like global warming (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011), nuclear 
energy (Peters and Slovic 1996), and the proliferation of guns (Kahan, Braman, 
Gastil, Slovic, and Mertz 2007).  
Lastly, fatalists consider themselves subject to binding external 
constraints, yet excluded from membership in important social groups (low group, 
high grid). They believe that they have little control over their lives and that one’s 
fate is much more a matter of chance than choice. In other words, the things that 
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happen in life are essentially random or (at the very least) beyond human control. 
This makes it extremely difficult to generate a priori expectations about the risks 
that fatalists will attend to. 
Given their propensity to focus on different threats when scanning their 
environment, it is quite likely that hierarchs, individualists, and egalitarians will 
attend to different subsets of information when encountering a risk/stimulus. If 
these subsets of information elicit different appraisals then these groups will 
experience different emotions. 
 
Gender and Race 
Beyond culture, pervasive stereotypes backed by empirical evidence 
suggest that socio-biological attributes like gender and race/ethnicity represent 
additional factors that may mediate the relationship between information exposure 
and emotional experience. Though scholars have advanced a number of social and 
biological theories that purport to explain this phenomenon (e.g., Hochschild 
1975; Fischer 1993; Ridgeway and Cornell 2004), the current consensus seems to 
be that historical and persistent power imbalances in society predispose women 
and minority groups towards experiencing higher levels of uncertainty and lower 
levels of control (power) than men and majority groups that are faced with the 
same situation (Brody and Hall 2008). As a result, women and minority groups 
tend to experience fear and sadness in response to the same situation that 
disproportionately elicits anger among men and majority groups.       
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As interesting and important as these arguments are, the empirical record 
is rather mixed. With respect to gender, for example, some research has found that 
women are indeed more likely to experience fear (anxiety) and sadness than men 
(Brody 1999; Simon and Nath 2004), whereas men are more inclined than women 
to experience anger (Ross and Van Willigen 1996). Other studies have found that 
women experience all types of emotion—including anger—more often and more 
intensely then men (Gross and John 1998). Finally, a number of scholars that have 
studied the link between gender and emotion report that there is little if any 
difference between men and women (Brody 1985; Brody and Hall 2008). The 
same lack of consensus is found in research on emotional responses by 
race/ethnicity—some scholars have found that race and ethnic differences explain 
some variation in emotional experience (Simon and Nath 2004), whereas other 
scholars have found few if any differences across groups (Matsumoto 1993).  
Nevertheless, the importance of the question (where do emotions and 
perceived risks come from?) and the mixed empirical evidence, demand that new 
research must be undertaken focusing on the relationships between gender, race 
and ethnicity and emotions. 
 
2.3: Theoretical Implications for Research on Disasters 
Applying insights from this literature to the way in which people think 
about and respond to disasters yields a number of propositions. First and 
foremost, risk and decision theorists now agree that many if not all of the 
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judgments and decisions that humans make are subject to and therefore influenced 
by some form of affective reasoning. This insight yields the following 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: Affect systematically influences the ways in which people think 
about and respond to disasters.  
 
More specifically, however, recent research suggests that discrete emotions of the 
same valence, like sadness, anger, and fear motivate different perceptions of risk, 
judgments, and decisions. This insight motivates a critical sub-proposition about 
the relationship between affect and individual responses to disasters:  
 
Proposition 1.1: Discrete emotions of the same valence will differentially impact 
the way in which people think about and respond to disasters.  
 
This sub-proposition is particularly important to research on crises and disasters 
because events of this sort are likely to induce overwhelmingly negative emotions 
in large portions of the population, thus limiting variation on positive-negative 
valance and, consequently, our ability to explain differences in individual 
responses to crises and disasters. 
Second, recent research indicates that the emotions individuals experience 
when confronted with the same stimulus vary from person to person. What makes 
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one person feel angry, for instance, might make another person feel sad. More 
importantly, scholars are beginning to understand that this variation is not 
random; rather, it appears that complex sets of cognitive filters—like cultural 
worldviews, gender, and race—systematically influence the emotions that 
individuals experience in response to a stimulus. This insight generates a second 
proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: Different groups of people are predisposed to experience different 
types of emotions when responding to the same set of information. 
   
Again, this proposition is critical for research on crises and disasters. If we know 
which groups of people are more likely than others to experience specific 
emotions, then we can generate a priori predictions about which portions of a 
population are likely to do what in the event of a crisis or disaster.  
When combined and considered in tandem with previous research on 
individual responses to disasters, these propositions suggest the “hierarchical” 
model of decision-making illustrated in Figure 2.1. At the lower (proximate) 
level, decision-making is governed by dual-process wherein parallel systems of 
information processing—an emotionally driven experiential system (affect) and a 
more systematic rational system (reason)—interact to influence the way in which 
individuals think about and respond to disasters. In other words, people engage in 
two different styles of thought—one that is based on reason (line 4) and 
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calculation and one that is driven by affect/emotion (line 5)—when making 
choices about how they should respond to a disaster.  
At the higher (distal) level, relatively abstract social orientations like 
cultural worldviews and socio-biological group identities (i.e., race and gender) 
anchor the calculations (line 1) and filter the emotional experiences (line 2) that 
drive individual responses to a disaster at the proximate level. As a result, 
emotions that people experience and the ends that individuals “rationally” pursue 
when confronted with a disaster are neither random nor idiosyncratic; rather, 
certain groups of people are systematically predisposed to experience different 
emotions and pursue different goals (maximize different utilities) when 
encountering the same disaster. 
 
Figure 2.1: A hierarchical 
model depicting the way in 
which individuals think about 
and respond to crises and 
disasters 
 
Cultural Worldviews and 
Socio-biological Attributes 
Affect Reason 
Response 
(Decision) 
Stimulus 
(Disaster) 
2 1 
5 4 
3 
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Though this model better comports with contemporary theories of risk and 
decision-making, it is relatively complex and therefore difficult to test within the 
confines of a single project. Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on the 
underdeveloped left-hand (affect) side of the model. More specifically, Chapter 4 
tests the link (line 5) between affect and decision-making and Chapter 5 explores 
the link (line 2) between cultural worldviews, socio-biological attributes, and the 
emotional experience.  
In order to do this, however, I have to employ valid and reliable measures 
of the emotions that individuals experience in response to a crisis or disaster. 
Then, I have to demonstrate that different people experience different emotions 
when responding to the same crisis or disaster. If it turns out that everyone 
experiences the same emotional response to a particular scenario, there would be 
little, if any, reason to proceed to the testing phase. Accordingly, the next chapter 
addresses these issues—measurement and variation. 
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Chapter 3: Measurement and Variation of Individual-Level 
Emotional Responses to Disasters 
 
3.1: Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, this dissertation builds upon recent 
research on the relationship between affect, risk, and cognition to argue that the 
discrete emotions (fear, anger, sadness, etc.) that individuals experience when 
confronted with a crisis or disaster will influence the ways in which they think 
about and respond to that disaster. Taking this argument one step further, I also 
contend that the emotions that individuals experience in response to such a 
situation are not entirely stochastic; rather, different groups of people will be 
predisposed to experience different emotions when encountering the same 
situation. 
Before I am able to empirically test these propositions, I have to do two 
things. First I must demonstrate that I can measure (and have measured) the 
discrete emotions that individuals experience in response to a crisis or disaster. 
Then I have to demonstrate that different people experience different kinds of 
emotions when responding to the same crisis or disaster. If it turns out that 
everyone experiences the same emotional response to a particular scenario, there 
would be little, if any, reason to proceed to the testing phase. 
My ability to test for systematic individual-level variation in emotional 
responses to crises depends upon my ability to measure emotion, which is a 
difficult concept to define, let alone measure. Nonetheless, researchers from a 
variety of disciplines have spent many years developing and testing a wide variety 
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of instruments that purport to measure specific emotions. In this chapter I briefly 
describe these instruments with a particular emphasis on the strengths and 
weakness of each approach. Drawing from this discussion I then introduce the 
nominal and interval measures of discrete emotions that I use in this dissertation. 
From there, I subject my measures to a battery of empirical tests designed to 
evaluate their validity and reliability. Throughout this discussion I look for 
evidence that different people experience different emotions when responding to 
the same crisis or disaster. I then conclude with a brief discussion of my findings 
and their implications for the remaining portions of this dissertation. 
  
3.2: General Approaches to Measuring Discrete Emotions 
Objective Measures 
Generally speaking, the instruments that researchers employ to measure 
discrete emotions can be sorted into one of two categories—“objective” or 
“subjective” (Izard 1982; Desmet 2003). 13 “Objective” measures are designed to 
capture the preconscious (“mind-independent”) substrates of emotion that 
individuals are not capable of recognizing and/or expressing. For example, a 
number of psychologists have developed measures that are based on the pattern of 
facial, vocal, and postural expressions that individuals exhibit when reacting to a 
particular stimulus (e.g., Ekman and Friesen 1975, 1978; Izard 1979). Similarly, 
                                                
13 I use the terms “objective” and “subjective” to remain consistent with the 
literature in the field. 
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other groups of scientists have been working to develop objective measures of 
emotion by tracking the wide variety of physiological responses—like changes in 
blood pressure, pupil dilation, body temperature, skin conductivity, and heart 
rate—that are thought to accompany the experience of emotion (e.g., Picard 1998; 
Ahn 2010).  
Objective metrics such as these are valuable in that they provide an 
unobtrusive measure of emotion that is not influenced by an individual’s ability or 
inability to recognize and then express the complex mix of emotions that they are 
experiencing at a given point in time. Despite this advantage, there are some 
rather serious limitations associated with objective measures. Foremost among 
these is that emotion is generally considered to be a subjective or “constructed” 
state that each and every individual experiences in a slightly different way. In 
other words, the combination of psychological and physiological reactions that I 
perceive to be fear might be different than the combination of reactions that you 
associate with the same emotion.  
 
Subjective Measures 
Because of this limitation, a large group of scholars advocate the use of 
perception-based “subjective” measures that are explicitly designed to capture the 
emotions that individuals consciously associate with a given set of physiological 
and psychological reactions. In order to accomplish this, they have developed a 
suite of self-report measures that typically rely upon surveys or interviews to 
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document an individual’s assessment of his or her own emotional state. Generally 
speaking, this is done in one of three ways—free association, affect-adjective 
rating scales, or pictograms. Measures based on free or “continued” association 
simply ask individuals to write down the feelings that come to mind when 
thinking about a particular prompt or stimulus. Open-ended measures of this sort 
are quite common in the literature because they allow researchers to capture 
individual emotions in a way that is not biased by differential interpretations of 
question wording or a limited list of preselected emotions.   
The well-known weaknesses associated with the free association approach 
are manifold, but three are particularly problematic for this project and therefore 
worth mentioning. First, the approach gives complete discretion to the individual 
that is participating in the study, which often results in large amount of unusable 
data because the participant ignores the question or misunderstands it and writes 
something that is tangential or irrelevant. Second, the data that is usable can be 
very difficult to quantify which can lead to challenges associated with statistical 
modeling and/or other analytical procedures. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, measures of this sort force individuals to respond as if they are 
experiencing only one emotion at a time, when in reality they are experiencing 
some combination of emotions at any given time. For example, a person may say 
that they are feeling sad in response to the open-ended question, when in reality 
they are mostly sad, but also a little bit scared and angry. 
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Due in part to the weaknesses associated with the free association method, 
a number of researchers use affect-adjective rating scales in order to measure the 
subjective experience of emotion. Measures of this sort ask study participants to 
read and react to series of adjectives that are thought to be indicators for a smaller 
set of latent emotions. For example, one version of the Differential Emotions 
Scale (DES) that was developed and iteratively refined by Carroll Izard and his 
colleagues, asks respondents to indicate the extent to which the following 
adjectives describe the way they feel: happy, joyful, delighted, scared, afraid, 
fearful, enraged, mad, angry (see Izard 1971, 1977). Responses to this question 
are then used to position participants with respect to three different emotions—
enjoyment, fear, and anger (respectively).14 When compared to the free 
association technique, this approach is appealing because it typically generates 
more usable data that is easier to quantify. More importantly, it allows researchers 
to detect the experience of multiple emotions at once. However, there are some 
limitations associated with the use of affect-adjective rating scales. Most notably, 
their reliance on specific adjectives that are likely to mean different things to 
different groups of people makes them somewhat difficult to apply across diverse 
populations. The language that a highly educated doctor in New Hampshire will 
use to describe anger, for instance, is likely to be different than the language that a 
                                                
14 A number of other researchers use similar metrics based on affect-adjective 
rating scales. For examples, see Zukerman (1960), Nowlis (1965), Plutchik and 
Kellerman (1974), and Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, and Tellegen (1988).   
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less educated poor farmer from rural Mississippi will use. The same can be said 
about differences between generations, countries, and across time—language is 
rarely a constant and precision can be lost in translation. 
In an effort to overcome this limitation, scholars have developed a third 
approach to the subjective measurement of emotion that uses images (pictograms) 
as opposed to words to capture the variety of emotions that individuals might 
experience in response to a particular stimulus. For example, Margret Bradley and 
Peter Lang (1994) developed a frequently used measure of “generalized emotional 
states” they call the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM). In short form, the SAM 
(and similar) method asks participants in a study to indicate the extent to which a 
series of pictograms describe the way they feel. These pictograms include things 
like smiling, happy figures, frowning, unhappy figures, and/or yawning, sleepy 
figures that are closing their eyes. The theory underlying this technique is that 
facial expressions are a universal indicator of emotion that people from all walks 
of life will be able to identify with. Accordingly, this approach to measuring 
emotions is not affected by variation with respect to population characteristics 
making it an ideal choice for research that incorporates heterogeneous groups of 
people. 
 
3.3: Measuring Emotions in this Dissertation 
In this dissertation I am interested in the way in which conscious 
emotional experiences orient individual thoughts about and responses to crises 
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and disasters. As such, I decided that the subjective approach to measurement 
based on self-report was the most appropriate.15 After making this decision, I 
faced a choice between the use of free association, affect-adjective rating scales, 
and/or pictograms. After some deliberation, I decided that a pictogram-based 
measure was unnecessary because the sample of participants that I rely upon in 
this study (undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma) is fairly 
homogenous. This left me with free association and affect-adjective rating scales, 
both of which were included on the survey instrument I used to measure emotion. 
 
Survey Instrument 
In order to answer a number of questions about the relationship between 
emotion and individual reactions to disasters, I created a survey instrument that 
contains 59 questions and takes approximately 22 minutes to complete.16 The first 
part of the instrument is designed to capture data on the demographic 
characteristics of the survey respondent. The second portion of the instrument 
contains a battery of questions designed to gauge risk perceptions and attitudes 
about nuclear weapons and US national security, as well as number of questions 
designed to measure individual attitudes, values, and core beliefs (like cultural 
                                                
15 In future work, I plan to incorporate pre-conscious emotion (and objective 
measures) into my understanding of individual thoughts and reactions to crises 
and disasters. 
16 The survey instrument is included in Appendix 1. 
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worldviews). In order to induce the emotional experiences on which this 
dissertation is based, the third part of the instrument begins by asking participants 
to carefully read the hypothetical scenario17 described below (which includes a 
picture of the map listed in Figure 1) and imagine how they would feel if the 
events that are described were to happen in the near future.18 
  
                                                
17 This scenario was inspired by (and is therefore similar to) one of the three 
scenarios that Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva developed in a separate study of 
public opinion about nuclear weapons (Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 2011). 
18 The use of hypothetical scenarios to induce emotional reactions from survey 
participants is common in social psychology (i.e., Roseman 1991; Smith and 
Lazarus 1993; Weiner 1985) as well as research on crises and disasters (i.e., 
Schultz, Gruntfest, Hayden, Benight, Drobot, and Barnes 2010). For a discussion 
about the convergent relationship between emotional reactions to “real” (online) 
and hypothetical (imagined) stimuli, see Robinson and Clore 2001. 
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SCENERIO: The year is 2013. In an effort to assert his military prowess, 
Kim Jung Un—the newly appointed leader of North Korea—begins 
shelling Seoul (the capital of South Korea), bombing South Korean air 
bases, and invading South Korea. U.S. and South Korean forces slow the 
invasion and conduct airstrikes on military targets in North Korea using 
conventional munitions. Within a week, the North Korean invasion is 
reversed, and U.S. and South Korean ground forces regain South Korean 
territory and prepare to invade North Korea. Without warning, two 
advanced models of the Taepodong-2 missile are launched from North 
Korea. One strikes Honolulu, Hawaii with a nuclear explosion producing at 
least 40,000 fatalities and unknown numbers of injured and missing 
persons. U.S. naval facilities at Pearl Harbor are heavily damaged. The 
second North Korean missile is intercepted off the coast of Alaska and 
destroyed by U.S. missile defenses before it reaches its intended target of 
Seattle, Washington. Chinese and Russian nuclear forces are brought to 
their highest levels of alert, and both countries call on all parties to cease 
hostilities. North Korea warns that if American and South Korean forces 
invade North Korea, it will launch additional nuclear missile strikes against 
cities in the United States and South Korea. 
 
Figure 3.1: The map used on the survey instrument to induce 
emotional reactions from the participants 
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After the scenario is presented, the instrument prompts respondents to 
answer a series of free association and affect-adjective questions that are designed 
to measure the emotional reactions that they experience when thinking about the 
events depicted in the scenario. The free association question simply directs 
respondents to write down the first feeling that comes to mind “as you think about 
the events depicted in the aforementioned scenario.” The affect-adjective 
questions ask respondents to indicate (using a scale from zero to ten) the degree to 
which a set of nine adjectives “describe how you feel” when thinking about the 
events depicted in the hypothetical scenario. The nine adjectives—which were 
borrowed from the Izard’s Differential Emotions Scale—are: mad, angry, 
enraged, sorrowful, sad, heartbroken, scared, fearful, and afraid.19 The first three 
adjectives were meant to gauge anger; the second three items were intended to 
capture sadness; and the last three adjectives were included as an indicator of 
fear.20 After this set of questions, the fifth and final portion of the instrument 
                                                
19 I employ the adjectives used in Izard’s scale because they have been repeatedly 
validated in a wide variety of studies. For an excellent review of this literature, 
see Kotsch, Gerbnig, and Schwartz (1982). 
20 The other emotions tapped by Izard’s Differential Emotions Scale are interest, 
joy, and disgust. Given the content of my scenario, I assumed that these emotions 
would be less prevalent then anger, fear, and sadness. As such, I did not include 
items designed to tap these emotions on this survey. 
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contains a set of questions designed to measure individual opinions about how the 
government should respond to the scenario.  
 
3.4: Present Study 
Participants and Procedure 
In order to evaluate the instrument and the items used to measure emotion, 
I asked undergraduate students from nine different Political Science classes at the 
University of Oklahoma if they would be willing to fill out an in-class survey 
about nuclear weapons. In total, 585 students agreed and completed the survey. 
Of these, 45% were female and 55% were male. The majority of them were in 
their first or second year of college (55% were first year students, 23% were in 
their second year). In terms of race and ethnicity, 76% of the participants 
identified themselves as “white,” whereas 24% of the students selected another 
racial or ethnic category from the following list: Native American, Asian, Black, 
Hispanic, Something else. With regard to education, 73% of the students that 
completed my survey came from relatively educated families where at least one of 
their parents graduated from college. As is the case with most non-probability or 
“convenience” samples that are drawn from a college population, 93% of the 
students who completed the survey fell between the ages of 18 and 23, resulting 
in a mean age of approximately 20 years old. 
Social scientists have long recognized the pitfalls that accompany the use 
of non-probability samples, like the sample I employ in this study. Samples of this 
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sort, for example, make it difficult—if not impossible—to make inferences about 
the distribution of a particular variable within broader populations or to comment 
on the magnitude of associations between different variables in the general 
population (e.g., Sears 1986; Peterson 2001; Henry 2008). Nevertheless, 
researchers generally agree with David Yeager and his colleagues in noting that 
the use of non-probability samples is “quite reasonable if one’s goal is not to 
document the strength of an association in a population but rather to reject the null 
hypothesis that two variables are completely unrelated to each other throughout 
the population” (Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, and 
Wand 2011; see also Berrens, Bohara, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, and Weimer 2003). 
In other words, sampling strategies like the one I employ in this dissertation are 
justified when used to assess the extent to which two or more variables are related 
to one another in a theoretically predictable fashion—as I do in this and 
subsequent chapters. 
 
3.5: Nominal Measure of Discrete Emotion 
As described in the previous section, the instrument contains two different 
sets of questions that are designed to capture emotional reactions to the 
scenario—one based on free association and one based on the use of affect-
adjective scales. This study (and the dissertation as a whole) uses individual 
responses to the free association question in order to create a nominal 
(categorical) measure of emotion. Construction of this measure was a two-step 
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process. First, participants were asked to write down the first feeling that came to 
mind when thinking about the events depicted in the aforementioned scenario. 
Then, content analysis was used to categorize individual responses into one of the 
six categories—interest, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear—that Carroll Izard 
has documented in his repeated study of “basic” emotions (see Table 3.1).21   
Upon doing so, I found that roughly 40% (n = 217) of the responses that 
participants gave could not be coded into one of these six categories. This 
relatively large proportion was unsurprising given the previously noted tendency 
of free association measures to produce large amounts of unusable data. 
Limitations aside, nearly 60% (n = 308) of the responses to this question could be 
used to further investigate the relationship between emotion and individual 
responses to crises and disasters. Before doing so, however, it was necessary to 
evaluate the reliability and validity of the measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Note that each respondent was assigned to the category that best matched their 
association. As a result, no respondents were assigned to more than one category. 
42 
 
Table 3.1: Responses to the free association question by emotion category 
Category Responses to the Free Association Question 
Anger aggravated, anger, angry, enraged, frustration, irritated, mad, 
outrage, outraged, pissed, upset 
Fear anxiety, anxious, apprehension, concern, concerned, danger, 
fear, fearful, fright, frightening, horror, nervous, panic, 
paranoia, scared, scary, terrified, worried, worry 
Sadness devastating, disappointed, disappointment, grief, heartache, 
heartbroken, hurt, mournful, sad, saddened, sadness, sorrow, 
sorrowful, sorry 
Disgust disgust, hate, hatred 
Interest curiosity, interest 
Joy N/A 
 
Reliability 
In measurement theory, reliability denotes “the extent to which an 
experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated 
trials” (Carmines and Zeller 1979, p. 11). When applied to the sort of content 
analysis that I used to construct this measure of emotion, reliability generally 
focuses on the degree to which multiple researchers yield consistent results when 
coding the same set of data. Methods for assessing “inter-coder” agreement vary 
depending on the features of the data that are coded, but generally follow a two-
step set of procedures wherein two or more researchers independently code the 
data (or some portion of the data) and then compare their results using a statistical 
measure of consistency like Cohen’s kappa, which is calculated by way of the 
following equation:   
𝑘 = 𝑝 𝑎 − 𝑝(𝑒)1− 𝑝(𝑒)    
where p(a) is the probability of observed agreement between coders and p(e) is 
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the probability that the coders will agree by chance alone given the number of 
categories in the data.22 If the two coders are completely consistent, kappa (k) will 
be one. If the coders are completely inconsistent k will be zero. Though there are 
no universally accepted criterion, k values that exceed 0.75 are said to be 
excellent, values between 0.40 and 0.75 are fair to good, and values of 0.40 or 
lower are generally considered poor (Fleiss, Levin, and Paik 2004). 
In order to evaluate the reliability of the nominal measure that was just 
described, a separate researcher independently coded the responses that 
participants gave according to the procedure that was outlined above. I then 
compared her results to my results and found that we agreed with one another 
more than 95% of the time, which translates to a kappa value of 0.94 [0.91, 0.96]. 
By any standards—including those listed above—this indicates a high degree of 
consistency, which suggests that this measure of emotion is indeed reliable. 
 
Validity 
Having evaluated the reliability of this measure, we turn now to the issue 
of validity, which denotes the extent to which an instrument “measures what it is 
supposed to measure rather than reflecting some other phenomenon” (Carmines 
and Zeller 1979, p. 16). As with reliability, there are a number of different ways 
                                                
22 There are a variety of other statistics that purport to measure inter-coder 
reliability. Cohen’s kappa was used because it is the most commonly used 
measure in the behavioral sciences (Dewey 1983). 
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to evaluate the validity of a measure. One of the most common techniques 
involves the establishment of face validity. Evaluation by way of face validity 
provides an assessment of the degree to which a particular measure “looks like” it 
is accurately reflecting the concept it is designed to measure. For example, if 
previous experience (and/or basic logic) indicates that the concept you are trying 
to measure behaves in a particular way in a given situation, and your measure is 
behaving in a way consistent with that experience, then your measure is said to 
have face validity. 
Applying this test to the concept that I am trying to measure, logic 
suggests that the distribution of emotions that individuals will experience when 
thinking about the use of a nuclear weapon against the US with exhibit a specific 
pattern. Most people will experience negative emotions like anger, fear, sadness, 
and/or disgust, whereas relatively few people will experience positive emotions 
like interest and/or joy. If the measure of emotion that is based on free association 
is valid, we should witness this sort of pattern in student response to the open-
ended question.  
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Figure 3.2: The distribution of free association responses to the hypothetical 
scenario by emotion category. 
 
As demonstrated by the distribution of responses that is depicted Figure 
3.2, this is precisely what I found. Of the 308 responses that fell within one of 
these six categories, 0% (n = 0) were coded as joy, less than 1% (n = 2) were 
coded as interest, approximately 2% (n = 5) were coded as disgust, roughly 16% 
(n = 50) were coded as sadness, a little more than 35% (n = 109) were coded as 
fear, and the remaining 47% (n = 138) of responses were coded as angry. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that this measure of emotion exhibits face 
validity. Moreover, this distribution of responses clearly indicates that different 
people experienced different emotions when responding to the same crisis or 
disaster. Unfortunately, variation and face validity offer necessary but not 
sufficient evidence that a particular measure is valid. As such, many researchers 
attempt to establish a second form of “convergent” validity by comparing newly 
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created measures to separate measures that were designed to gauge similar 
concepts. In the section that follows, I will evaluate the convergent validity of the 
measures by comparing the nominal measure of emotion to the interval measures 
constructed using affect-adjective rating scales. Before doing so, however, it is 
necessary to evaluate the reliability of my interval measures. 
 
3.6: Interval Measures of Discrete Emotion 
In addition to the nominal measure that was just described, this study (and 
the dissertation as a whole) employs a series of interval measures of emotion 
based on public responses to the affect-adjective rating scales. These measures 
were created by averaging individual orientations on the zero-to-ten affinity scales 
for each of the nine adjectives (mad, angry, enraged, sorrowful, sad, heartbroken, 
scared, fearful, and afraid) described above. The Anger Index averaged across the 
“angry” adjectives (mad, angry, enraged), the Sadness Index across the “sad” 
adjectives (sorrowful, sad, heartbroken), and the Fear Index averaged across the 
“fear” adjectives (scared, fearful, afraid). A high score on any one, two, or all 
three of these indices indicated a relatively strong affinity with that (or those) 
emotion(s).  
Compared to the nominal strategy that was descried above, the interval 
measurement strategy yielded scores on all three indices for almost all of the 
respondents that completed the survey (93%; n = 540). This makes the interval 
measures particularly promising for exploring the relationships among emotions 
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and responses to crises and disasters. Before turning to that analysis, however, it 
is important to assess whether these indices provide reliable and valid indicators 
of anger, sadness, and fear. 
  
Reliability 
There are a number of different ways to evaluate the reliability of 
composite indices, the most common of which is a test for internal consistency. 
Roughly speaking, internal consistency gauges the extent to which multiple items 
that purport to measure the same latent construct produce consistent scores. To 
test for internal consistency, researchers generally use one of several statistics that 
are estimated by comparing the pairwise correlations of different items in a 
composite index. The most popular such statistic is called Cronbach’s alpha, 
which provides a reliability estimate that ranges between zero and one, where 
higher values indicate higher levels of internal consistency.   
With this in mind, I calculated Cronbach’s alpha estimates for each of the 
emotion indices that I described above. Doing so yielded alpha values of 0.87, 
0.94, and 0.92 for the sadness index, fear index, and angry index, respectively. 
Though scholars have been hesitant to define a universal standard of acceptability, 
most would agree that alpha values in excess of 0.7 indicate an “acceptable” 
degree of internal consistency (Lattin, Carroll, and Green 2003). Accordingly, one 
could say that my measures of fear, sadness, and anger are internally consistent 
and therefore reliable. Unfortunately, social scientists and statisticians have long 
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recognized that Cronbach’s alpha is of limited value when one is dealing with 
multidimensional and/or latent constructs—as I am with these measures (i.e., 
Cortina 1993; Schmitt 1996). In light of this recognition the literature suggests 
that researchers use of other tools—like confirmatory factor analysis (aka 
measurement models)—to evaluate the reliability of composite indices that tap 
multiple and/or latent concepts. 
Similar to exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) is a multivariate statistical procedure that helps researchers examine 
patterns of association among observed and latent variables in a given set of data. 
Despite this similarity, EFA and CFA are statistically and conceptually distinctive 
forms of analysis that are used to accomplish different tasks. EFA is a data 
reduction technique that researchers use in order to identify the factor solution 
that accounts for as much variation in their data as possible.  
When using EFA, the researcher is not required to make specific 
hypotheses about the number of factors that will emerge from the analysis or 
which items will correspond with which factors. In other words, the data—not the 
researcher—suggest the model structure. If prior notions do exist, they are not 
incorporated into the analysis and they do not affect the results. Because of this, 
EFA cannot be used to test specific hypotheses about the relationship between 
observed and latent variables in a given set of data. CFA, by comparison, is a 
theory driven analytical procedure that requires the researchers to make specific 
hypotheses about the number of latent factors contained in their data, the 
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relationship among those factors (whether or not they are correlated), and which 
items will correspond with which factors. In other words, CFA is a relatively 
demanding technique that requires an in-depth understanding of expected model 
structure prior to estimation. The payoff that accompanies the costs associated 
with added information, however, is relatively high. Unlike EFA, CFA can be 
used to test hypotheses about how well a hypothesized model fits a given set of 
data, to assess the reliability (internal consistency) of a latent construct, and to 
evaluate the validity of multidimensional measures. 
With this distinction in mind, I used CFA to evaluate my interval 
measures of emotion (fear index, sadness index, and anger index) that were 
constructed by equally weighting responses to the set of nine affect-adjective 
items listed above. Before doing so, I hypothesized the following: 1) that I would 
obtain a three factor solution (one factor per latent emotion); 2) that these three 
factors would only correspond with the set of three items that they were intended 
to produce; 3) that these three factors would be correlated with one another. 
Likewise, because it is impossible to simultaneously estimate the variance of a 
common factor and the value of the loadings for all of the items that load on that 
factor, the variance of the common factors were set to one.23 Doing so produced 
                                                
23 This is a common way to handle this problem. A second approach is to set at 
least one of the loadings for each factor to some arbitrary value (usually 1.0). I 
chose the former approach because it facilitates interpretation (Lattin, Carroll, and 
Green 2003).   
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the results depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Confirmatory factor analysis of responses to the affect-adjective 
rating scales; GFI = 0.96; AGFI = 0.92; NNFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.98; RMSAE = 
0.08. 
 
As indicated by the goodness-of-fit statistics, the CFA model fits the data 
rather well.24 The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) is 0.96 and the adjusted goodness-
of-fit index is (AGFI) is 0.92, both of which exceed the generally agreed upon 
rules of thumb (0.95 and 0.90) denoting of a good fit (Lattin, Carroll, and Green 
2003). Likewise, the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) values are greater than 0.95, which is the generally agreed upon benchmark 
for an acceptable fit. Finally, the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSAE) index is 0.08, which is right on the cutoff value of ≤ 0.08 (Schreiber, 
Nora, Stage, Barlow, King 2006). More importantly, the standardized loadings 
                                                
24 A series of models with different numbers of factors and different patterns of 
covariation were tested against this model. The model presented in Figure 3 out 
preformed the alternatives. 
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coefficients listed next to the unidirectional arrows in Figure 3 suggest a high 
degree of internal consistency. All of them are above the standard threshold of 
0.70. These results suggest that this set of interval measures reliably capture the 
emotions that individuals experience when thinking about the scenario. 
 
Validity 
Having established the reliability of the interval measures, we turn now to 
the issue of validity. Do the indices measure the emotional experiences that they 
were intended to measure rather than some other phenomenon? As mentioned 
during the validation of my nominal measure, face validity provides researchers 
with one tool for assessing the validity of their measures. Measures are said to 
demonstrate face validity if they behave in a way that is consistent with logic or a 
priori expectations based on previous research. In the context of my research, for 
example, logic suggests that individuals will experience a variety of 
predominantly negative feelings when thinking about the use of nuclear weapons 
against the US. Within this array of negative feelings, previous research (see 
Figure 2 above) suggests that anger, fear, and sadness will feature rather 
prominently. Thus, valid indicators of emotion would reflect this pattern of 
experiences.  
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Figure 3.4: Mean scores on the emotion indices. 
The results shown in Figure 3.4 suggest that my interval measures of 
emotion achieved this standard. When measured in this way, we see that the 
participants who completed the survey experienced relatively high levels of anger, 
sadness, and fear when thinking about the hypothetical nuclear attack. The mean 
scores on all three indices were well above the midpoint of 5. In fact, more than 
76% of the respondents scored a 6 or higher on the Anger Index; roughly 62% 
scored a 6 or higher on the Sad Index; and, almost 59% of the respondents scored 
a 6 or higher on the Fear Index. In other words, the measures behaved as I 
expected them to, thus achieving some degree of face validity. At the same time, 
however, there was a reasonable amount of variation within the data around the 
mean score on each of these indices. For example, the sample standard deviation 
of the zero-to-ten Anger Index was 2.47, the standard deviation of the Sadness 
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Index was 2.60, and the standard deviation of the Fear Index was 2.86. In other 
words, these distributions provide additional evidence that different people 
experience different combinations of emotion when responding to the same crisis 
or disaster. Again though, variation and face validity offer necessary but not 
sufficient evidence that a new measure is valid. As such, researchers often try to 
establish other forms of validity, like discriminant and/or convergent validity.  
Discriminant validity gauges the extent to which a set of measures is able 
to distinguish between the different concepts that they are designed to measure. 
With respect to this project, for example, are my emotion indices able to 
differentiate between fear, sadness, and anger? Or, does one of the indices 
account for two, or even all three emotions? As one might expect, there are a 
number of different ways to answer these questions, many of which use 
confirmatory factor analysis. For instance, the most popular technique for 
assessing discriminant validity focuses on the correlation between the different 
factors in a CFA model. If two (or more) of the factors are highly correlated, they 
may be capturing similar constructs and are therefore said to demonstrate poor 
discriminant validity. 
A second look at Figure 3 allows one to conduct this test with relative 
ease. Because I fixed the factor variances to one when estimating that model, the 
little numbers next to the bidirectional arrows (slings) that connect the factors to 
one another represent the correlations between the respective factors. For 
example, the correlation between the SADNESS and ANGER factors is 0.39. 
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Similarly, the correlation between the FEAR and ANGER factors is 0.31. The 
SADNESS and FEAR factors, by comparison, are correlated at 0.56. In other 
words all of the factors are moderately correlated with one another, indicating 
(unsurprisingly) that there are relationships among the different emotions. To 
determine whether or not these correlations are strong enough to cause alarm, I 
followed Farrell (2009) in comparing each correlation to the average amount of 
variance extracted from each factor (AVE). For discriminant validity to be 
supported, he argues, the square root of each AVE should exceed the correlations 
between each factor.  
As it turns out, the square roots of the AVE values for the CFA model 
depicted in Figure 3 are 0.89, 0.84, and 0.91 for the ANGER, SADNESS, and 
FEAR factors (respectively). None of the correlations in the model even approach 
these levels. As such, it is fair to say that the different factors are able to 
distinguish between the distinct concepts that they are intended to measure. It 
follows, then, that the indices for these latent factors are valid indicators of the 
distinctive emotions—fear, sadness, and anger. 
 
Convergent Validity: A Comparison of the Nominal and Interval Measures 
In the previous sections, the nominal and interval measures were evaluated 
in isolation. Doing so provided evidence suggesting that both measures were 
reliable and valid indicators of emotional experience. In this third and final 
section the interval and nominal measures are pitted against one another in order 
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to test for convergent validity. Roughly speaking, convergent validity gauges the 
extent to which two measures that were developed in different ways indicate the 
same things when subjected to the same sets of data. For example, one might 
validate a newly designed digital thermometer by comparing the temperature 
reading it yields to the reading a mercury thermometer yields when subjected to 
the same atmospheric conditions. If both measures yield the same results, we can 
be more confident that the two measures are measuring what they are supposed to 
measure. 
In the context of this project, the nominal and interval measures were 
compared to one another by estimating three single-factor (one-way) ANOVA 
models, where the emotional indices (Fear Index, Anger Index, and Sadness 
Index) served as the outcome (dependent) variables and the nominal measures of 
emotion served as the grouping (independent) variables. If the measures are valid, 
the respondents that were assigned to the various categories of emotion should 
score differently on the emotional indices. More importantly, these differences 
should demonstrate a specific pattern, wherein the respondents who were placed 
in the anger, sadness, and fear categories should score higher than the other 
groups on their respective indices. For example, the people that were placed into 
the anger category based on their response to the free association question should 
score highly on Anger Index relative to those who were placed in the fear or 
sadness categories. 
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With respect to the first test, the omnibus statistics from my analysis 
indicated that the mean differences across the emotional categories in all three 
models were significant (p < 0.001 in all three models). More importantly, the 
post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the pattern of differences among the groups 
were consistent with my expectations. As illustrated in Figure 3.5(a), for example, 
the Anger group scored significantly higher on the Anger Index than did the other 
two groups. Panels (b) and (c) in Figure 3.5 demonstrate similar patterns, wherein 
the Sadness and Fear groups scored significantly higher on the Sadness and Fear 
Indices, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean scores on the emotion indices (interval measures) by emotion 
category (nominal measure). Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
These findings indicate that my nominal and interval measures of emotion are 
tapping similar constructs, which provides strong supporting evidence that the 
two measures are, in fact, valid indicators of the emotions that individuals 
experience when confronted with a disaster like the one I presented in my 
instrument. 
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3.7: Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, I presented a model suggesting that emotions 
influence the way in which people think about and respond to natural and 
anthropogenic disasters. I also argued that different groups of people are 
predisposed to experience different emotions when encountering the same crises 
or disasters. In the next two chapters, I test these propositions. In order to 
undertake those analyses, however, I had to come up with a way (or multiple 
ways) to measure emotions and then demonstrate that different people experience 
different emotions, or combinations of emotions, when faced with the same crisis 
or disaster.  
Inspired by previous attempts to measure emotion, this chapter described 
the development of a nominal indicator, based on free association, and an interval 
indicator of emotional experience based on affect-adjective scales. These 
measures were subjected to a battery of tests, which demonstrated that they are 
valid and reliable indicators of subjective emotional experience. Lastly, I used 
these measures to corroborate the notion that different people experience different 
emotions. When given the exact same information about a hypothetical nuclear 
attack, some people experience sadness, whereas others experience anger and/or 
fear. 
With this in mind, the chapter that follows addresses an important follow-
up question. Do these differences matter? Do they influence the way in which 
individuals think about and respond to crises disasters? 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Discrete Emotions on Individual 
Responses to a Hypothetical Disaster 
  
4.1: Introduction 
In the previous chapter I presented evidence that different people 
experience different types—and levels—of negative emotion (fear, anger, and 
sadness) when faced with the same crisis or disaster. This chapter is motivated by 
a relatively straightforward follow-up question: do these differences matter? In 
other words, do discrete emotions of the same valance—like anger, fear, and 
sadness—differentially affect the way in which individuals think about and 
respond to crises and disasters? 
  
4.2: Theoretical Overview 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, proposed a model of individual decision-
making that explicitly incorporates the notion that affect influences the way in 
which people think about and respond to disasters. In and of itself, this is an 
important yet neglected proposition that is worthy of empirical investigation. 
Investigation, however, requires some degree of specificity about the nature of the 
relationship between affect and decision-making. Unfortunately, the record of 
scholarship advanced by risk and decision theorists is divided in a way that 
inhibits such specificity.    
On one side of the divide, scholars advocate a valence-based approach to 
the relationship between affect and decision-making, which suggests that 
individuals collapse their emotions onto a unidimensional positive-negative scale 
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before drawing upon them to make decisions (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, 
and Johnson 2000; Peters and Slovic 2000; Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 
2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2004). As a result, the differences 
between emotions like anger, fear, and sadness are ignored—the important thing 
(for purposes of cognition) is that all three of these emotions are negative and 
therefore have the same effects on opinions, decisions, and behaviors. On the 
other side of the divide, scholars suggest that individuals differentially experience 
and draw upon specific emotions of the same valance—like anger, fear, and 
sadness—when making decisions (e.g., DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, and Ruker 
2000; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001). As a result, the 
differences between discrete emotions of the same valance are quite important 
because they motivate different opinions, decisions, and behaviors. 
The end result of this debate is particularly important for research on 
crises and disasters because events of this sort are likely to induce 
overwhelmingly negative emotions in large portions of the population. For 
example, when students were asked to reflect upon the hypothetical nuclear 
disaster that was described in the previous chapter, less than 1% of them reported 
positive feelings. Rather, almost all of the students experienced some sort of 
negative feeling. This lack of variation leaves advocates of valance-based theories 
little room for explaining divergent patterns of individual decision-making. The 
practical and theoretical implications of this seemingly trivial note are actually 
quite important—if valance-based theories of affect and decision-making are 
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correct, and almost everyone experiences negative emotions in response to a crisis 
or disaster, then adding emotion to our models of individual decision-making will 
result in little if any added value. To paraphrase an old adage, you can’t explain a 
variable with a constant.    
A more promising pattern of variation emerges when one considers the 
different types of negative emotions that individuals experience when confronted 
with a disaster. Referring back to the previous chapter, for example, the students 
that reflected upon the hypothetical nuclear disaster experienced a range of 
discrete emotions, most notably anger, fear, and sadness—all of which share a 
negative valence. If emotion-specific theories of affect and decision-making are 
correct, then this variation is quite important and it may help us to explain the 
decisions that different people make when confronted with the same crisis or 
disaster.  
In sum, valence-based and emotion-specific theories offer divergent views 
about the nature of the relationship between affect and decision-making. 
Resolving this difference is theoretically and practically important to advancing 
our understanding of the role that affect plays in guiding individual behavior 
before, during, and after disasters. With that said, the next section of this chapter 
attempts to resolve this debate by subjecting the two theories to empirical test. Do 
discrete emotions of the same valance—like anger, fear, and sadness—
differentially or uniformly affect the way in which individuals think about and 
respond to crises and disasters?  
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 4.3: Present Study  
To answer this question, the present study uses the survey data that were 
described in Chapter 2. As a brief reminder, these data include student responses 
to an original survey that was designed to illicit and then measure the emotions 
that people experience when thinking about a hypothetical disaster—a nuclear 
attack on the US (from North Korea) that kills 40,000 Americans and injures 
countless others.25 After capturing these responses, the survey goes on to gauge 
individual opinions about how the government should respond to the disaster as 
well as the amount of confidence that respondents have in the opinion they 
express.  
Of the 585 students that participated in the study, 45% were female and 
55% were male. The majority of respondents were in their first or second year of 
college (55% were first year students, 23% were in their second year). As is the 
case with most samples that are drawn from a college population, 93% of the 
participants who completed the survey fell between the ages of 18 and 23, 
resulting in a mean age of approximately 20 years old. In terms of race and 
ethnicity, 76% of the participants identified themselves as “white,” whereas 24% 
of the students selected another racial or ethnic category from the following list: 
Native American, Asian, Black, Hispanic, or Something else. All of the 
participants were students at the University of Oklahoma and most (73%) of them 
                                                
25 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the survey instrument.   
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came from relatively well-educated families where at least one of their parents 
graduated from college. 
 
4.4: Measures 
Dependent Variables 
 To characterize the systematic influence of affect on the way in which 
individuals think about disasters, the analysis that follows focuses on respondent 
opinions about how the government should respond to the hypothetical disaster as 
well the amount of confidence that respondents have in their opinions about how 
the government should respond. More specifically, individual responses to two 
different survey questions represent the dependent variables in this study.    
 First, respondents were asked to indicate which of the following actions 
the US should pursue in response to the hypothetical nuclear attack:26  
1. Diplomacy and negotiations: Demand an immediate cease-fire and warn 
that further nuclear attacks from North Korea will result in full-scale U.S. 
nuclear retaliation. 
                                                
26 These response options, like the scenario presented in Chapter 3, were inspired 
by (and are therefore similar to) one of the scenarios and response options that 
Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva developed in a separate study of public opinion 
about nuclear weapons (Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Silva 2011). 
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2. Airstrikes using conventional armaments: Conduct air attacks using 
precision guided conventional munitions against known and suspected 
nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North Korea. 
3. Invasion using conventional armaments: Conduct air, land, and sea attacks 
against North Korea using conventional armaments against known and 
suspected nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North Korea. 
4. Retaliation using nuclear weapons: Conduct nuclear strikes against North 
Korea using U.S. intercontinental ballistic and cruise missiles against 
known and suspected nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North 
Korea. 
Using data gathered from responses to this question, an ordinal measure of 
opinion was created that ranges from relatively pacific (diplomacy and 
negotiations) to relatively militant (nuclear retaliation) response options. As 
indicated by Figure 4.1, diplomacy was the most populated category (n = 226), 
followed by airstrikes (n = 125), nuclear retaliation (n = 88), and then ground 
invasion (n = 74).     
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of opinions about how the government should respond to 
the hypothetical nuclear strike. 
  
 Second, respondents were asked to indicate how confident they were 
(using a zero to ten scale) that the option they selected is the “best possible course 
of action” considering the circumstances listed in the scenario. Using data 
gathered from responses to this question, an interval measure of confidence was 
created that ranges from zero, which indicates little if any confidence, to ten, 
which indicates high levels confidence in the opinion expressed when answering 
the question listed above. 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of confidence that respondents have in their opinions 
about how the government should respond to the hypothetical nuclear strike. 
  
As indicated by Figure 4.2, the participants in this study were, on average, fairly 
confident in their opinions about how the government should respond to the 
disaster (mean = 6.88), but there was some variation around the mean (standard 
deviation = 2.04). 
 
Independent Variables 
The interval measures of fear, anger, and sadness that were introduced in 
Chapter 3 were used to create the independent variables in this study. As a brief 
reminder, these measures were inspired by a reduced version of the Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES) developed and iteratively refined by Carroll Izard and his 
colleagues (Izard 1971, 1977; Kotsch, Gerbing, and Schwartz 1982). Specifically, 
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respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which each of the following 
adjectives “describe how you feel” when thinking about the events depicted in the 
hypothetical scenario: mad, angry, enraged, sorrowful, sad, heartbroken, scared, 
fearful, and afraid.  
Given the negative valence associated with each of these adjectives, an 
equally weighted valence index was created by averaging responses to all nine of 
these items (alpha = 0.87; mean = 6.61; sd = 2.04). Though theoretically 
appropriate, it is important to remember that the multivariate analysis summarized 
in Chapter 3 does not support the construction of this unidimensional scale.  
As such, emotion-specific indices were also created. Specifically, 
responses to the first three items (mad, angry, and enraged) were averaged in 
order to create an equally weighted Anger Index (alpha = 0.92), responses the 
second three items (sorrowful, sad, and heartbroken) were averaged to create a 
Sadness Index (alpha = 0.87), and responses to the final three adjectives (scared, 
fearful, and afraid) were averaged in order to create a Fear Index (alpha = 0.94). 
In aggregate, anger was the most intense emotion that participants experienced 
when thinking about the scenario (mean = 7.38; sd = 2.47), followed by sadness 
(mean = 6.36; sd = 2.60), and then fear (mean = 6.10; sd = 2.86). 
 
4.5: Hypotheses 
If valance-based theories of emotion are correct, then the valence index 
described above will best characterize the relationship between emotion and 
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respondent opinions about how the government should respond to the 
hypothetical nuclear attack as well as individual confidence in those opinions. 
Moreover, because fear, anger, and sadness are all negative, they will exert 
roughly uniform effect (positive, negative, or null) on opinions and confidence. If 
emotion-specific theories are correct, by contrast, then the emotion-specific 
indices will better characterize the relationship between emotion and respondent 
opinions about how the government should respond to the nuclear attack as well 
as individual confidence in those opinions. Furthermore, fear, anger, and sadness 
will exert a differential effect on respondent opinions and confidence.  
For example, because anger is triggered by and elicits appraisals of 
certainty, individual control, and responsibility, it creates a desire (“action 
tendency”) in individuals to remove/punish the entity responsible for the 
unpleasant situation (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001; Betancourt and Blair 1992; 
Smith and Ellsworth 1985). As such, one would expect that respondents who 
experienced high levels of anger when asked to think about the hypothetical 
nuclear strike will express relatively militant opinions about how the government 
should respond to the strike and they will be relatively confident in those 
opinions. 
Fear arises from and evokes appraisals of uncertainty and a lack of 
control, which are associated with the implicit goal of avoiding future harm by 
removing one’s self from the unpleasant situation (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001; 
Lazarus 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Accordingly, respondents that 
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experienced high levels of fear will tend to favor less militant and more 
diplomatic responses to the nuclear attack because they are less likely incite future 
conflict. Given their fear, however, these respondents will relatively little 
confidence in their opinions.  
Similar to fear, sadness is elicited by and projects appraisals of 
helplessness—situational rather than individual control (e.g., Lerner, Small, and 
Lowenstein 2004; Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993). As such, respondents 
that experienced high levels of sadness will tend to favor less militant responses 
because the situation is beyond individual control and military action could 
prolong the unpleasant situation. Unlike fear, sadness does not evoke intense 
levels of uncertainty; nor however, does it evoke the sort of certainty that is 
typically associated with anger. As such, it is not clear that there will be a 
relationship between the experience of sadness and the levels of confidence that 
respondents express in their opinion about how the government should respond to 
the hypothetical nuclear attack. 
 
4.6: Analytical Strategy 
To test these hypotheses, the analysis that follows proceeds in two stages. 
In stage one, I estimate two ordered logit (proportional odds) models that predict 
opinions about how the government should respond to the disaster as a function of 
1) the valence index and 2) the emotion-specific indices described above.27 In 
                                                
27 To make sure that this approach to modeling was appropriate, I ran a variety of 
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stage two, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate two linear models where 
confidence is regressed on 1) the valence index and 2) the emotion-specific 
indices.   
 
4.7: Findings 
Stage 1 
 Results from the first stage of this analysis are summarized in Table 4.1, 
which reveals several interrelated pieces of evidence that support the emotion-
specific (rather than the valence-based) model of affect and decision-making. 
First, there is no statistically discernable relationship between individual scores on 
the valence index and opinions about how the government should respond to the 
hypothetical disaster. Second, a comparison of the AIC statistics associated with 
each model suggests that the emotion-specific model better fits to the data. Third, 
a look at the coefficients in the emotion-specific model indicates that fear, anger, 
                                                                                                                                
tests to ensure that these models do not violate the parallel regression assumption 
that is made when estimating ordered models. For example, I estimated a binary 
regressions model for each level of y; upon doing so I found that my coefficient 
estimates were relatively consistent across the levels—suggesting that the 
assumption was not violated and that an ordered logit model is appropriate. Just to 
be sure, however, I also estimated a multinomial logit model. As expected, the 
estimates I derived via multinomial regression were almost identical to the 
estimates I got when using ordinal regression.  
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and sadness exert a differential (rather than uniform) effect on respondent 
opinions. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of an ordered logit model that estimates the effect of 
affective valence and then discrete emotions on individual opinions about 
how the government should respond to the hypothetical nuclear attack. 
 Valence-Based Model Emotion-Specific Model 
 Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Coefficients     
Valence Index -0.008 0.016 — — 
Sadness Index — — -0.052^ 0.040 
Fear Index — — -0.126*** 0.035 
Anger Index — — 0.333*** 0.044 
Intercepts     
1|2 -0.326 0.262 0.346*** 0.346 
2|3 0.675*** 0.264 0.356*** 0.356 
3|4 1.451*** 0.272 0.368*** 0.368 
n-size 483 483 
AIC 1242.983 1174.389 
Notes: ^ p < 0.10 and *** p < 0.001 in one-tailed t-tests; parameter 
estimates are listed as ordered log-odds 
  
 Specifically, there was a strong, positive, and statistically significant 
relationship between anger and support for a relatively militant governmental 
response. In marked contrast, there was an equally strong and significant negative 
relationship between scores on the Fear Index and support for militant 
governmental responses. Lastly, there was a substantively subtle but negative 
relationship between sadness and militancy. 
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Figure 4.3: The predicted probability that a hypothetical respondent would 
support diplomacy, airstrikes, ground invasion, and nuclear retaliation given their 
levels of fear, anger, and sadness. Note: predictions were calculated by setting the 
non-moving coefficient estimates in Table 1 to their sample means.   
  
To better demonstrate these effects, Figure 4.3 graphically illustrates a set 
of predicted probabilities that were derived from the parameter estimates 
summarized in Table 1. According to these predictions, for example, a shift from 
low (0) to high (10) on the Anger Index dramatically decreases the probability 
that an individual will support diplomacy (Δp = -0.648)28 and increases the 
likelihood that an individual will support airstrikes, ground invasion, or nuclear 
retaliation (Δp = 0.200, 0.178, and 0.270, respectively). This pattern in reversed 
when looking at the association between fear and opinion, which is depicted in 
panel (b). A shift from low (0) to high (10) on the Fear Index substantially 
                                                
28 Δp denotes a change in probability.  
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increases the likelihood of that an individual will support diplomacy (Δp = 0.298) 
and decreases the probability that a person will support airstrikes, ground 
invasion, or nuclear retaliation (Δp = -0.035, -0.092, and -0.171, respectively). A 
similar but fainter pattern characterizes the relationship between sadness and 
opinion, wherein a shift from low (0) to high (10) on the Sadness Index 
moderately increases the probability that an individual will support diplomacy 
(Δp = 0.128) and decreases the predicted probability that a person will support 
airstrikes, ground invasion, or nuclear retaliation (Δp = -0.020, -0.041, and -0.067, 
respectively).   
In short, these results provide strong evidence that discrete emotions of the 
same valence differentially rather than uniformly impact public opinions about 
how the government should respond to the hypothetical disaster. In other words, 
the results are consistent with an emotion-specific rather than valence-based 
understanding of the relationship between affect and decision-making.  As such, I 
turn now to a second test. Do fear, anger, and sadness differentially impact the 
amount of confidence that individuals have in the opinions they expressed? 
 
Stage 2 
Results from stage two of this analysis are numerically summarized in 
Table 4.2. Again, the evidence supports the emotion-specific (rather than the 
valence-based) model of affect and decision-making. First, the relationship 
between confidence and individual scores on the valence index is statistically 
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indistinguishable from zero, which explains the insignificant F-statistic associated 
with the valence-based model. Second, a rough comparison of the R2 associated 
with each model (0.004 vs. 0.075) suggests that the emotion-specific model 
explains more variation in the confidence that individuals expressed in their 
opinions about how the government should handle the disaster. Last but not least, 
the partial regression coefficients in the emotion-specific model indicates that 
fear, anger, and sadness exert a differential (rather than uniform) effect on 
confidence. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of a linear (OLS) model that estimates the effect 
of affective valence and then discrete emotions on the confidence that 
individuals have in their opinions about how the government should 
respond to the hypothetical nuclear attack. 
 Valence-Based Model Emotion-Specific Model 
 Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Coefficients     
Valence Index -0.024 0.018 — — 
Sadness Index — — 0.008 0.041 
Fear Index — — -0.156*** 0.036 
Anger Index — — 0.199*** 0.039 
Intercept 7.265*** 0.281 6.334*** 0.314 
n-size 516 516 
F-stat 1.824 13.880*** 
R2 0.004 0.075 
Note: *** p < 0.001 in one-tailed t-tests. 
 
Specifically, there was a strong, positive, and statistically significant 
relationship between scores on the Anger Index and variations in confidence, 
when controlling for fear and sadness. By contrast, there was an equally strong 
and significant negative relationship between scores on the Fear Index and the 
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confidence that respondents expressed in their opinions about how the 
government should respond. Lastly, the estimated relationship between sadness 
and confidence was slightly positive, but not distinguishable from zero. 
 
Figure 4.4: The predicted amount of confidence that a hypothetical respondent 
would have in their opinion about how the government should respond to the 
nuclear strike given their levels of fear, anger, and sadness. Note: predictions 
were calculated by setting the non-moving coefficient estimates in Table 2 to their 
sample means. 
  
To better illustrate the substantive impact of discrete emotions, Figure 4.4 
graphically presents a set of predictions that were derived from the parameter 
estimates summarized in Table 4.2. According to these predictions, for example, a 
shift from low (0) to high (10) on the Anger Index results in a two-point (~18%) 
increase on the zero to ten indicator of confidence. A similar shift from low (0) to 
high (10) on the Fear Index has the opposite effect—it results in a 1.5-point 
(~14%) decrease in predicted confidence. Lastly, we see that changes on the 
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Sadness Index had little if any effect in the amount of confidence that respondents 
had in their opinions about how the government should respond to the 
hypothetical nuclear strike. 
 
4.8: Conclusion 
 In the previous chapter I found that different people experience different 
types—and levels—of negative emotion (fear, anger, and sadness) when faced 
with the same crisis or disaster. This chapter was motivated by a relatively 
straightforward follow-up question that was designed to test Proposition 1.1, 
which was laid out in Chapter 2: do these differences matter? In other words, do 
discrete emotions of the same valance—like anger, fear, and sadness—
differentially affect the way in which individuals think about and respond to crises 
and disasters? In short, my answer to this question is yes. Anger, fear, and 
sadness, had divergent effects on opinions about how the government should 
respond to the crisis as well as the level of confidence that individuals had in their 
own opinions.  
 By implication, these results also support the first proposition that was 
articulated in Chapter 2. As a general phenomenon, affect systematically 
influences the ways in which people think about and respond to disasters. 
Therefore, if we want to understand the decisions people make when confronted 
with a disaster—i.e., the decisions not to take protective action after hearing a 
tornado warning—then we should consider the emotional state of the decision-
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maker when the decision was made. People who are angered (or frustrated) by the 
inconvenience of (and opportunity costs of actions implied by) a tornado warning, 
for example, are likely to make different decisions than individuals who are 
scared by that warning.   
 If this is the case, the critical next step in advancing our understanding of 
the way in which people think about and respond to disasters is developing our 
understanding of individual-level variation in the emotions that people experience 
in response to the same crisis. Returning to the example listed above, why is it 
that some people are angered by an event (or piece of information) whereas others 
are scared by it? The next chapter provides an initial look at exactly this question.  
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Chapter 5: Explaining Individual-Level Variation in Emotional 
Experience 
 
5.1: Introduction 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that different people experience different types—
and levels—of negative emotion (fear, anger, and sadness) when given the same 
information about a crisis or disaster. The analysis provided in Chapter 4 
confirmed that these difference matter. Despite their common valances, fear, 
anger, and sadness differentially affect the ways in which individuals think about 
and respond to crises and disasters. This chapter takes a step back to reflect upon 
a critical yet understudied foundational question—where do these emotions come 
from in the first place? More specifically, what explains the individual-level 
variation in emotional experience that we observed in Chapter 3? Why is it that 
some people experienced fear whereas other people experienced sadness and/or 
anger when thinking about the hypothetical nuclear disaster? 
 
5.2: Theoretical Overview 
 As outlined in Chapter 2, there are essentially two ways that scholars have 
gone about answering these questions. On one side of the debate, scholars have 
argued (often implicitly) that the emotions humans experience in response to a 
stimulus are a function of the information they receive about that stimulus (e.g., 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson 2000). If this argument is correct, then 
two (or more) people that are exposed to the same information will, on average, 
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experience the same emotions.29 Deviations from this pattern will be rare and due 
to idiosyncratic differences in individual ability to process and then translate 
information into an “appropriate” emotional response.30 As a result, individual-
level variation in the emotions people experience when reacting to the same 
information is essentially stochastic and therefore unpredictable. 
 On the other side of the debate, scholars have noted that individuals are 
endowed with a fairly complex set of cognitive filters that direct our attention 
towards certain types of information and away from other types of information 
(Jenkins-Smith 2001). For example, cognitive filters steer attention away from 
information that threatens an individual’s cultural worldview and/or social 
identities and towards information that confirms or reinforces them (Kahan, 
Braman, Gastil, Slovic, and Mertz 2007). People with different worldviews and/or 
identities may be exposed to the same set of information but attend to different 
aspects or components of that information. If this is the case, then two (or more) 
people that are exposed to the same information may well respond on the basis of 
completely different emotional reactions. The broader implication of this 
argument is that individual-level variation in the emotions people experience 
                                                
29 Or, put differently, they will share a common emotional response plus random 
variation. 
30 For an introduction to a variety of disorders and psychopathologies that inhibit 
an individual’s ability to process and then translate information into an 
“appropriate” emotional response, see Post (2003).  
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when reacting to the same information is (to some extent) systematic and 
therefore predictable. 
 The resolution of this debate is particularly important because, in a 
disaster related emergency, saving lives and property hinges upon the ability of 
practitioners and policymakers to generate a priori predictions about how different 
portions of a population are likely to respond. If (as suggested by the findings 
presented in the previous chapter) these responses are systematically influenced 
by discrete emotions, then practitioners and policymakers will need to know who 
is likely to feel what as a potential crisis approaches. Whether or not this is 
possible depends on which of the abovementioned camps is correct—are the 
discrete emotions that individual experience when given the same information 
about a crisis idiosyncratic and unpredictable or systematic and somewhat 
predictable given our understanding of cognitive filters? 
 
5.3: Present Study 
To answer this, I use the survey data that were described in Chapter 2. As 
a brief reminder, these data are comprised of student responses to an original 
survey that was designed to elicit and then capture the discrete emotions that 
people experience when thinking about a hypothetical nuclear attack on the US 
that kills 40,000 Americans and injures countless others.31 Before capturing these 
experiences, the survey asks respondents to identify their demographic 
                                                
31 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the survey instrument.   
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characteristics and to answer two sets of questions designed to measure individual 
orientations with respect to the worldviews posited by Cultural Theory (CT). 
Of the 585 students that participated in the study, 45% were female and 
55% were male. The majority of respondents were in their first or second year of 
college (55% were first year students, 23% were in their second year). As is the 
case with most samples that are drawn from a college population, 93% of the 
participants who completed the survey fell between the ages of 18 and 23, 
resulting in a mean age of approximately 20 years old. In terms of race and 
ethnicity, 76% of the participants identified themselves as “white,” whereas 24% 
of the students selected another racial or ethnic category from the following list: 
Native American, Asian, Black, Hispanic, or Something else. All of the 
participants were students at the University of Oklahoma and most (73%) of them 
came from relatively educated families where at least one of their parents 
graduated from college. 
 
5.4: Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in this chapter is the set of emotional reactions that 
respondents experienced when asked to think about the hypothetical disaster. As 
explained in Chapter 3, these reactions were measured in two different ways. 
First, respondents were asked to write down the first feeling that came to mind 
when thinking about the events depicted in the scenario. This technique—which is 
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often called “free” or “continued” association—is quite common in the literature 
on affect and risk perceptions because it allows researchers to capture individual 
associations in a way that is not biased by the imposition of closed-ended 
questions (Leiserowitz 2005). After these responses were collected, content 
analysis was used to categorize individual reactions into one of the six 
categories—interest, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear—that Carroll Izard has 
outlined in his repeated study of “basic” emotions (e.g., Izard 1977).  
Doing so revealed a somewhat predictable breakdown of emotional 
reactions, in which the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated a 
negative (anger, fear, disgust, or sadness) rather than positive (joy or interest) 
emotional reaction to the scenario. Of the 308 responses that fell within one of 
these six categories, 0% (n = 0) of were coded as joy, less than 1% (n = 2) were 
coded as interest, approximately 2% (n = 5) were coded as disgust, roughly 16% 
(n = 48) were coded as sadness, a little more than 35% (n = 109) were coded as 
fear, and the remaining 47% (n = 144) of responses were coded as anger. Because 
there were so few observations that were coded as joy, interest, or disgust, the 
analysis that follows excludes the seven cases that fell into those categories. 
In addition to free association, a reduced version of the Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES) was used to measure individual orientations with respect to 
three of the six basic emotions: anger, sadness, and fear. Developed and 
iteratively refined by Izard and his colleagues, the DES lists a series of 
adjectives—each of which correspond to one of the basic emotions—and asks 
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respondents to indicate the degree to which each adjective describes their feeling 
state after receiving the stimulus. In this study, for instance, respondents were 
asked to indicate the extent to which each of the following adjectives “describe 
how you feel” when thinking about the events depicted in the hypothetical 
scenario: mad, angry, enraged, sorrowful, sad, heartbroken, scared, fearful, and 
afraid.  
Responses to the first three items were averaged in order to create an 
equally weighted Anger Index (alpha = 0.92), responses the second three items 
were averaged to create a Sadness Index (alpha = 0.87), and responses to the final 
three adjectives were averaged in order to create a Fear Index (alpha = 0.94). In 
all, anger was the most intense emotion that participants experienced when 
thinking about the scenario (mean = 7.38; sd = 2.47), followed by sadness (mean 
= 6.36; sd = 2.60), and then fear (mean = 6.10; sd = 2.86).    
 
Independent Variables 
Cultural Worldviews. Individual orientations with respect to the “active” 
worldviews posited by CT—hierarchy, egalitarianism, and individualism—were 
also measured in two different ways. First, a nominal measure was created by 
presenting participants with three different statements and asking them to select 
the statement that best describes their outlook on life. The statements, which are 
listed in Table 5.1, were designed to mimic the way in which an archetypal 
individualist, hierarch, and egalitarian would think about the world around them. 
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Table 5.1: The statements used to categorize participants by cultural worldview 
Hierarch Statement: I am more comfortable when I know who is, and who is 
not, a part of my group, and loyalty to the group is important to me. I prefer to 
know who is in charge and to have clear rules and procedures; those who are in 
charge should punish those who break the rules. I like to have my responsibilities 
clearly defined, and I believe people should be rewarded based on the position 
they hold and their competence. Most of the time, I trust those with authority and 
expertise to do what is right for society. 
Individualist Statement: Groups are not all that important to me. I prefer to 
make my own way in life without having to follow other peoples’ rules. Rewards 
in life should be based on initiative, skill, and hard work, even if that results in 
inequality. I respect people based on what they do, not the positions or titles they 
hold. I like relationships that are based on negotiated “give and take,” rather than 
on status. Everyone benefits when individuals are allowed to compete. 
Egalitarian Statement: Much of society today is unfair and corrupt, and my 
most important contributions are made as a member of a group that promotes 
justice and equality. Within my group, everyone should play an equal role 
without differences in rank or authority. It is easy to lose track of what is 
important, so I have to keep a close eye on the actions of my group. It is not 
enough to provide equal opportunities; we also have to try to make outcomes 
more equal. 
 
When measured in this way, approximately 46% (n = 205) of the sample was 
classified as individualist, 37% (n = 165) as hierarch, and 17% (n = 74) as 
egalitarian. 
Second, interval indicators of the individualism, egalitarianism, and 
hierarchy were created by asking participants to denote the extent to which they 
agree with the set of nine statements listed in Table 5.2.32 The first three 
statements were designed to detect an egalitarian orientation; the second set of 
                                                
32 For a theoretical and empirical comparison of these two measures, see 
Ripberger (2012). 
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three statements an individualistic orientation; and the final three statements an 
orientation towards hierarchy. 
 
Table 5.2: The 9 statements I used to measure individual orientations with respect 
to the worldviews posited by CT 
1. What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods 
more equal. 
2. Society works best if power is shared equally.  
3. It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the 
poor.  
4. Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people 
succeed or fail on their own.  
5. Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.  
6. We are all better off when we compete as individuals.  
7. The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do what you are told to do. 
8. Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority.  
9. Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on 
those who break the rules. 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) and tests of scale reliability were used to 
evaluate the psychometric performance of these metrics. As expected, the PCA of 
this set of nine questions extracted three components that were highly correlated 
with the appropriate statements. Likewise, the alpha values of the egalitarianism, 
individualism, and hierarchy scales were moderately high—0.70, 0.63, 0.59, 
respectively. Accordingly, indices for each orientation were created by average 
responses to the set of indicators associated with each worldview. When measured 
in this way, individualism was the most prominent worldview in the sample 
(mean = 4.22; sd = 1.23), followed by hierarchy (mean = 4.14; sd = 1.14), and 
then egalitarianism (mean = 3.75; sd = 1.38).  
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 Gender and Race. Gender was measured by way of self-report, wherein 
participants were asked to indicate their gender by selecting male or female. 
Similarly, race was documented by asking participants to indicate which of the 
following best describes their race or ethnic background: Native American 
(American Indian), Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, Something else. Responses to 
this question were then dichotomized, by coding participants that selected “white” 
as white, and coding the remaining participants as nonwhite.33    
 
5.5: Hypotheses 
 If the discrete emotions that different individuals experience when given 
the same information are idiosyncratic and unpredictable then there should be 
little if any relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
described above. If emotional experiences are systematic and partially 
predictable, then the opposite will hold—there will be a statistically discernable 
and theoretically consistent relationship between the emotions participants 
experienced in response to the scenario and the set of cognitive filters they 
possess. 
                                                
33 In an alternative coding scheme, I created a dichotomous variable “minority” 
variable by coding, self-descried Blacks, Hispanics and American Indians as 
minorities (1s) and everyone else (Asians included) as non-minorities (0s). The 
results presented below remain the same regardless of the scheme used. 
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 For example, because each of the cultural types is expected to constantly 
scan their environment for threats to relevant to their identity, hierarchs will focus 
on the parts of the scenario that disrupt security and order. As such, they are (in 
comparison to other groups) expected to experience higher levels of anger and 
fear in response to the hypothetical disaster. Egalitarians, by comparison, will 
attend to the parts of the scenario that threaten their key values, one of which is 
the collective wellbeing of their compatriots (group). As such, they are (in 
comparison to other groups) expected to experience higher levels of sadness when 
reflecting on the hypothetical disaster that killed 40,000 people and injured 
countless others. It is somewhat more difficult to predict individualist reactions to 
this particular scenario, which says nothing about the explicit loss of liberty (a key 
value for individualists). Nevertheless, if individualists anticipate that an event of 
this sort would (in the longer run) lead to additional restrictions and governmental 
intrusion upon personal privacy, then they like the hierarchs may experience 
increased levels of anger when reflecting upon the scenario. 
 As outlined in Chapter 2, the empirical literature on gender, race, 
ethnicity, and emotion is decidedly mixed. The primary theoretical propositions, 
however, are fairly clear. Due in part to their vulnerability vis-à-vis more 
powerful groups in society, female and minority groups are predisposed to 
experience heightened levels of fear when faced with a threatening situation. If 
this is the case, then the female and non-white participants are likely to experience 
higher levels of fear than male and white respondents when thinking about the 
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hypothetical nuclear attack described in the survey.  
 
5.6: Analytical Strategy 
To test these hypotheses, the analysis that follows proceeds in two stages. 
The first stage follows Keller, Visschers, and Siegrist (2012) in using multiple 
correspondence analysis (MCA) to evaluate the relationship between the set of 
nominal variables listed above. The second stage extends this analysis by looking 
at the extent to which the findings in stage one hold when emotional reactions to 
the scenario and cultural worldviews of the respondents are measured by way of 
interval rather than nominal measures. 
 
5.7: Findings 
Stage 1 
MCA—which is an extension of correspondence analysis—is a 
multivariate statistical technique that allows researchers to detect and visually 
represent associations among three or more nominal variables (or categories) in a 
given data set. Similar to PCA, it works by reducing multidimensional data to a 
relatively small number of dimensions (usually two) that account for as much of 
the variation within the data as possible. Once reduced, the data can be projected 
onto a two-dimensional map. The interpretation of MCA is then based upon the 
Euclidian proximity between points on this map—points that are close to one 
another demonstrate a high degree of correspondence, whereas points that are 
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relatively distant demonstrate a low degree of correspondence.  
To identify latent patterns in emotional responses to the hypothetical 
attack, a data set containing the nominal indicators of emotion, cultural 
worldview, gender, and race (white vs. non-white) was subjected to MCA. Doing 
so produced the two-dimensional solution that is visually represented in Figure 
5.1. A brief look at the way in which the points cluster in this map reveals a 
number of interesting and important findings.  
Foremost among these is the finding that the emotional reactions that 
people wrote down in response to the hypothetical attack were not entirely 
stochastic. Instead, the patterning of clusters in Figure 5.1 suggests that different 
types (or groups) of people were predisposed to experience specific emotions 
when confronted with the same stimulus. For example, the cluster on the left side 
of Figure 5.1 suggests that male and white participants as well as those who 
indicated that the individualist or hierarch statement “best described their outlook 
on life” were more likely to experience anger than sadness or fear when 
confronted with the stimulus. The cluster of points in the top right corner, by 
comparison, suggests that participants who identified with the egalitarian 
worldview tended towards sadness when presented with the same information. 
Finally, the cluster of points in the lower right panel of Figure 5.1 suggests that 
female and nonwhite participants disproportionately indicated a feeling of fear 
when contemplating the hypothetical nuclear attack. 
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Figure 5.1: An MCA map of the relationship between gender, cultural 
worldview, race, and the emotional reactions that participants 
experienced in response to the scenario.  
  
These findings support the general proposition that individual dispositions 
with respect to gender, race, and culture influence the emotions that people 
experience when confronted with a situation that is imbued with risk and 
uncertainty. In so doing, they also support the broader and perhaps more 
important contention that emotional experiences vary in systematic and 
predictable ways. However, MCA is generally considered an exploratory (visual) 
technique that is not designed for the testing of probabilistic or structural 
hypotheses. As such, the section that follows uses interval indicators of emotion 
to estimate a series of linear models that will help to validate and expand upon 
these findings by way of hypothesis testing. 
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Stage 2 
To “formally” test the hypotheses that emotional reactions to the 
hypothetical nuclear attack vary as a function of gender, race, and cultural 
worldview, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate linear 
models with three different dependent variables—the fear index, sadness index, 
and the anger index that were explained above. The set of independent variables 
used to estimate each model were the same; they included the egalitarianism 
index, hierarchism index, and individualism index; as well as dichotomous 
indicators of race and gender. 
Table 4 (above) and Figure 2 (below) summarize the results from this 
stage of the analysis. A brief look at these objects reveals a number of findings, 
many of which corroborate the findings in stage one and others call them into 
question. With respect to corroboration, these results confirm the most important 
finding in stage 1—the distributions of the emotional responses that respondents 
experienced when thinking about the hypothetical attack were not simply 
stochastic. Rather, the coefficient estimates and model statistics presented in 
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 indicate that some people were more likely than others to 
experience specific types of emotions. Notably, the partial regression coefficients 
in Table 5.3 indicate that the average female scored higher on the sadness and fear 
indices than did the average male participant. With respect to cultural worldviews, 
participants who were inclined towards hierarchism experienced a bit more fear 
and a lot more anger than did participants who scored relatively low on that index. 
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Participants with a penchant for egalitarianism, by comparison, experienced 
higher levels of fear but significantly lower levels anger than their non-egalitarian 
peers. 
    
Table 5.3: Summary of linear (OLS) models that estimate the relationship 
between gender, cultural worldview, race, and the emotional reactions that 
participants experienced in response to the hypothetical attack 
 Sadness Index Fear Index Anger Index 
Intercept -0.016 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) Individualism index -0.027 -0.044 -0.018 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) Hierarchism index 0.025 0.074* 0.208*** 
 (0.048) (0.044) (0.047) Egalitarianism index 0.075* 0.148*** -0.126** 
 (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) Gender (1 = Female) 0.177*** 0.374*** -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) Race (1 = Nonwhite) 0.036 -0.006 -0.029 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.044) R2 0.046 0.181 0.062 
N 512 520 512 
Notes: *p < 0.100, **p < 0.010, ***p < 0.001 in one-tailed t-tests. 
Standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
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Figure 5.2: The standardized coefficient estimate (and confidence intervals) 
derived from linear (OLS) models that estimates the relationship between gender, 
cultural worldview, race, and the emotional reactions that participants 
experienced in response to the hypothetical attack 
  
 Again, these findings are largely consistent with the findings presented in 
the first stage of the analysis. Nevertheless, there are some interesting and 
important differences between this stage and the previous stage that are worth 
noting. First, this stage of the analysis suggests that race—after controlling for the 
effect of gender, risk perceptions, and cultural orientation—had little if any 
impact on the discrete emotions that respondents experience when thinking about 
the hypothetical nuclear strike. This contradicts the finding in stage one, which 
suggested that non-white (minority) respondents were disproportionately likely to 
experience fear when they are compared to white respondents who tended to 
experience anger when thinking about the hypothetical attack. Second, the 
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findings in this stage of the analysis suggest that individual orientations with 
respect to individualism have little if any impact on the emotions that people 
experienced in response to the disaster. Again, this contradicts the analysis in 
stage one, which suggested that self-identified individualists disproportionately 
experienced anger when reflecting on the scenario. On the whole, these 
discrepancies are unsurprising given mixed record of empirical scholarship on the 
relationship between race/ethnicity and emotion and the guesswork associated 
with deriving a hypothesis for individualists that was described in the 
“hypotheses” section of the chapter. 
 
5.8: Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, I found that discrete emotions of the same 
valance—like anger, fear, and sadness—differentially affect the way in which 
individuals think about and respond to crises and disasters. This chapter was 
motivated by an important follow-up question: are the discrete emotions that 
individuals experience when given the same information about a crisis 
idiosyncratic and unpredictable or systematic and somewhat predictable given our 
understanding of cognitive filters? In accordance with the second proposition 
established in Chapter 2, the empirical evidence analyzed in this chapter support 
the latter argument by illustrating that certain groups of people were predisposed 
to experience different combinations of discrete emotions when responding to the 
same information about a disaster. 
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The broader and more important implication of this finding is that 
policymakers and practitioners can use this sort of information to make 
predictions about how information about a crisis or disaster is likely to affect 
different groups within a given population. Who is likely to experience what 
emotion and what does that mean with respect to their behavior? When thinking 
about the hypothetical disaster presented in this study, for example, female 
respondents consistently experienced higher levels of fear and sadness than did 
male participants who received the same information. The group of respondents 
that identified with an egalitarian worldview consistently experienced lower 
levels of anger and higher levels of fear than did hierarchs. 
Given my findings in the previous section, this means that females and 
egalitarians are likely to think about and respond to crises in a different way than 
are males and hierarches, and that the mechanism responsible for these 
differences is affective reasoning driven by specific rather than global emotions.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future 
Research 
 
6.1: Conclusions 
This dissertation was motivated by the pressing need to better understand 
the way that people think about and respond to natural and man-caused crises and 
disasters. As with most dissertations, I commenced the project by examining 
previous research on the subject. Doing so revealed a portrait of individual 
responses to disasters that does not comport with contemporary models of 
cognition advanced by psychologists and decision theorists. Most notably, extant 
research on crises and disasters paints individuals as calculated evaluators of risk 
that base their decisions about what to do when confronted with a crisis or disaster 
on systematic logic and reason. Though explanations like this provide valuable 
insight into the way in which idealized individuals (and possibly some portion of 
the population) respond to disasters, they neglect the well-confirmed finding in 
psychology and decision science that many (if not all) of the decisions that 
humans face are influenced by some form of affective reasoning. 
Driven by this discovery, I turned to recent research on risk and decision-
making to develop a model of individual decision-making in response to crises 
and disasters that explicitly incorporates affective reasoning. Upon doing so, I 
found that scholars in the field are generally united in support of the proposition 
that emotion (in addition to analytical reasoning) systematically influences human 
judgment and decision-making, but are divided on a number of more specific 
propositions about the nature of this relationship. For example, some theorists 
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argue that the positive-negative valence of an emotion is the only thing that 
humans consider when making choices. Others suggest that specific emotions of 
the same valence (like anger, sadness, and fear which are all negative) 
differentially affect decision-making. There are also disagreements about the 
forces responsible for variation in the emotions that different people experience 
when responding to the same stimulus. Some scholars imply that these forces are 
idiosyncratic and, by implication, that inter-individual variation is stochastic and 
unpredictable. Others suggest that individual-level variation is systematically 
related to the set of cognitive filters that individuals possess, and by extension, is 
somewhat predictable. Moreover, a growing body of research suggests that these 
filters may be grounded in deeply held beliefs, such as cultural worldviews. 
Encouraged by the commonalities and intrigued by the disagreements, I 
then combined elements of this literature with previous research on the way that 
people think about and respond to crises and disasters to propose a “hierarchical” 
model of decision-making, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. At the lower level 
(proximate to the decision), the model hypothesizes that decision-making is 
governed by a dual-process wherein parallel systems of information processing—
an emotionally driven experiential system (affect) and a more systematic rational 
system (reason)—interact to influence the way in which individuals think about 
and respond to disasters. In other words, the model suggests that people engage in 
two different styles of thought—one that is based on reason and calculation (line 
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4) and one that is driven by affect/emotion (line 5)—when making choices about 
how to respond when confronted by a crisis or disaster. 
 
Figure 6.1: A “hierarchical” model 
depicting the way in which individuals 
think about and respond to crises and 
disasters 
 
At the higher (more abstract) level, the model hypothesizes that relatively 
abstract social orientations like cultural worldviews and socio-biological group 
identities (i.e., race and gender) anchor the reasoned calculations (line 1) and filter 
the emotional experiences (line 2) that drive individual responses to a disaster at 
the proximate level. As a result, the ends that individuals “rationally” pursue and 
the emotions that people experience when confronted with a disaster are not 
entirely idiosyncratic; rather, certain groups of people are predisposed to pursue 
different goals (i.e., maximize different values) and experience different emotions 
when encountering the same disaster.  
Cultural Worldviews and 
Socio-biological Attributes 
Affect Reason 
Response 
(Decision) 
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Equipped with an updated model that better comports with contemporary 
theories, the empirical portion of the dissertation used survey responses to a 
hypothetical disaster (nuclear attack) to test the updated model. Chapter 3, for 
example, demonstrates that my instruments provided reliable and valid measures 
of emotion, and that subjects differed in the emotions they experienced when 
confronted with the same crises or disasters. The hypothetical nuclear attack, for 
example, elicited fear in some respondents and anger or sadness in others. This 
finding marked an important point of departure because inter-individual variation 
is a critical assumption that one makes when arguing that a particular variable, 
like emotion, explains discrepancies in human judgment and decision-making.  
The findings described in Chapter 4 provide empirical support for the 
general proposition that emotions influence the way that people think about 
disasters (line 5 in Figure 6.1). The analysis in Chapter 4 also supports the more 
specific sub-proposition that discrete emotions of the same valence (like anger, 
sadness, and fear) differentially impact individual responses to disasters. In the 
context of this study, for example, anger motivated relatively militant and 
confident opinions about how the US government should respond to the 
hypothetical nuclear attack. Fear, by comparison, provoked less militant and less 
confident opinions about how the government should respond.  
Chapter 5 moved up (to the more abstract level) in the model to present 
evidence in support of the proposition that individuals with different background 
characteristics and cultural worldviews are predisposed to experience different 
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emotions when given the same information about a crisis or disaster  (line 2 in 
Figure 6.1). When asked to think about the hypothetical nuclear attack, for 
instance, female subjects experienced heightened levels of sadness and fear 
whereas male subjects responded with higher levels of anger. Cultural worldviews 
marked another point of departure—survey respondents that were inclined 
towards hierarchism experienced more fear and a lot more anger than the 
participants who scored relatively low on that index. Participants with a penchant 
for egalitarianism, by comparison, reacted to the hypothetical disaster with similar 
amounts of fear but significantly lower levels of anger. 
In all, these findings reveal a strong and original body of evidence 
consistent with the assumptions and propositions posited by the right-hand 
(affect) side of model 6.1. As such, this dissertation provides theoretical and 
empirical support for the conclusion that affective reasoning (emotion) 
systematically influences individual reasoning about crises and disasters. 
 
6.2: Implications 
 The most obvious implication of this conclusion is that scholars, policy 
makers, and practitioners who are interested in how individuals and groups 
respond to crises and disasters should reconsider their understanding of human 
decision-making. The findings presented in Chapter 4 indicate that individual 
differences with respect to the kinds of emotions elicited by a crisis or disaster are 
responsible (in part) for some variation in the choices that people make when 
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confronted with such an event. Though important, this finding complicates a 
priori efforts to identify who is likely to do what in the event of a disaster, which 
is a critical first step in the dissemination of information about risk. In addition to 
knowing which portions of the population perceive themselves to be at risk, we 
need to know who is likely to feel what if a crisis or disaster were to occur. 
Fortunately, the results presented in Chapter 5 indicate that this is not an 
impossible task—if we know the predominant set of cognitive filters (i.e., cultural 
worldviews or combinations of demographic attributes) that drive individual 
reasoning in a given population, then we can generate informed propositions 
about the pattern of emotions that population is likely to experience, and, in turn, 
the kinds of responses and behaviors that population is likely to exhibit when 
faced with a particular crisis or disaster. 
 In addition to advancing the literature on individual responses to crises 
and disasters, the findings presented in this dissertation speak to important yet 
unresolved theoretical debates in a number of other fields, including decision 
science, risk analysis, and policy theory. With respect to the former, for example, 
the findings presented in Chapter 4 provide empirical evidence that sheds light on 
the ongoing feud between advocates of valance-based and emotion-specific 
approaches to studying affect and decision-making. In this case, the emotion-
specific approach clearly outperformed the valence-based approach, suggesting 
that “mainstream” models of emotion and decision-making (like the “affect 
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heuristic”) must be refined so as to incorporate the differences between discrete 
emotions of the same valence. 
 Chapter 5 speaks to another important debate in decision science about the 
nature and causes of individual-level variation in emotional reactions to the same 
stimuli (information). Is this variation idiosyncratic and unpredictable or 
systematic and therefore predictable? Again, the evidence presented in this 
dissertation supports the relatively small subset of scholars who have eschewed 
“mainstream” models by arguing that variation in emotional experience is 
systematic and therefore predictable. 
 Chapter 5 also speaks to important questions in the field of risk analysis. 
Most notably, it adds to a growing body of research on the social and cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for cultural polarization in public opinion about risk and 
risk management (e.g., Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil, and Slovic 2010). Why is 
it that egalitarians, hierarchs, and individualists persistently and vehemently 
disagree about how the government should respond to hazards like global 
warming, nuclear energy, and even nuclear warfare? The results presented in 
Chapter 5 provide strong evidence that emotion represents one answer to this 
question. When given the same information about a specific hazard, egalitarians, 
hierarchs, and individualists experienced different types and levels of emotional 
responses, that, as found in Chapter 4, can lead to divergent opinions about how 
the government should respond to a hazard. 
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 A similar argument can be made about the forces that underlie the well 
documented but theoretically perplexing “white-male” effect that confounds 
research on risk perception (e.g., Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz 1994). Why do men 
(particularly white-men) and women differ in their opinions about risk and risk 
management? Again, one approach to answering this question would involve an 
examination of the different emotions that men and women (and possibly 
different racial groups) experience when confronted with the same hazard. 
Knowing that a particular risk elicits anger in men and fear in women (or vice-a-
versa) may help to explain divergent views about how the government should 
manage that risk.  
Last but not least, this project as whole serves as an important note to 
policy theorists that emotions (perhaps in addition to attitudes, values, and 
preferences) orient the way that people think about public policy. Thus, in 
addition to studying the belief systems that motivate coalition formation, 
behavior, and policy change (e.g., Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), it is 
important that scholars address the role of emotion in these processes. For 
instance, is it possible that shared emotions (in addition to or in lieu of common 
beliefs) provide the glue that binds and/or the fuel that fires some advocacy 
coalitions or social movements (i.e., the “Tea Party” or the “Occupy Wall St.” 
movements)? If so, do the emotions that bind or fuel a coalition/movement impact 
the strategies, rhetoric, and policy proposals advanced by that movement? More 
importantly, what happens when the prevailing emotions in such a 
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coalition/movement subside or change—which is quite likely given the transient 
and ephemeral nature of some emotions (Frijda, Mansted, and Bem 2000) vis-à-
vis deep and policy core beliefs, which are difficult and slow to change (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993)? These questions have not been addressed by extant 
research on the policy process and therefore provide ample fodder for future 
research. Engaging in this sort of research, however, will require that policy 
theorists update their models of individual and group behavior so as to include the 
hitherto neglected role of affect and emotions. 
 
6.3: Directions for Future Research 
As discussed in the previous section, the theory and findings presented in 
this dissertation offer answers to a number of important questions that have direct 
and indirect implications for multiple fields of research. Nevertheless, the results 
presented here should—like all ongoing research programs—be subjected to 
future testing/refinement using additional data and alternative research 
designs/methods. As a first step in this direction, a study of this sort should be 
replicated using survey responses from a randomly (or semi-randomly) selected 
representative sample of the US population, rather than a convenient sample of 
college students at a single university. Though there are no a priori reasons to 
believe that such a study would yield different results, it would allow researchers 
to generalize these findings to the broader population. 
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Second, future research on the relationship between emotion and 
individual responses to crises and disaster should move beyond correlational 
analysis so that we can be more confident in the causal relationships stipulated by 
the model introduced in this dissertation. Survey experiments that randomly 
manipulate emotional experiences via targeted treatments represent one vehicle 
for accomplishing this task. Natural experiments based on “actual” rather than 
“hypothetical” crises and disasters represent another alternative. To accomplish 
this, however, one would need longitudinal data on individual emotions and 
decisions/behaviors before and after a disaster. Five or ten years ago this sort of 
data would be extremely difficult if not impossible to collect. Fortunately, recent 
advances in the collection and processing of “big data” (i.e., “tweets” on Twitter 
or “updates” on Facebook) make this sort of research more plausible. What if 
researchers could use these kinds of data to compare the expressed emotions and 
stated actions of a given individual before and after they experienced a crisis or 
disaster?    
This brings up a third direction for future research. In addition to studying 
the impact of emotion on decision-making and opinion formation (as I did in this 
dissertation), scholars should explore the influence of different emotions on 
individual behavior before, during, and after crises and disasters. One could 
assume (as many do) that because emotions influence judgment, decisions, 
opinion, and even stated behavior, they also influence actual behavior. As 
reasonable as it sounds, this assumption is an important theoretical conjecture 
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worthy of empirical investigation (Dollard 1948; Wicker 1969). Such an 
investigation would require data on individual behavior in response to actual 
rather than hypothetical crises and disasters because real incidents may induce 
different types and intensities of emotion and behavior than the sort of 
hypothetical scenario used in this dissertation. Again, however, such data are 
extremely difficult to collect via traditional instruments like surveys and 
interviews. As such, scholars wishing to pursue this line of research will have to 
be innovative and flexible in the sort of data they bring to bear on the question. 
Last but not least, it is important to point out that this dissertation focuses 
exclusively on the assumptions and propositions posited by the right-hand (affect) 
side of model 6.1. This decision was made because previous research on 
individual responses to crises concentrates on the left (reason) side of the model. 
Future applications of this model should study the relationship and interactions 
between the two sides. For example, how do discrete emotions impact systematic 
reasoning and vice versa (line 3)? Are angry people more or less likely than 
fearful people to engage in systematic reasoning? Do ex ante assessments of risk 
(both real and perceived) influence the emotions people experience in the event of 
an actual crisis or disaster? 
This list future research is merely the tip of the iceberg. Suffice it to say 
that the relationship between emotion and individual reasoning about crises and 
disasters is a sparse and therefore rich area of research that scholars (myself 
included) are only beginning to understand. My hope is that this dissertation will 
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guide and inspire future research on this practically and theoretically important 
relationship. More importantly, I hope that this dissertation and the research it 
inspires will be used to improve upon our capacity (as a society) to protect life 
and property by minimizing the impact of crises and disasters. 
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Appendix 1: Survey Instrument 
 
To begin, I would like to ask you some basic demographic questions. 
How old are you (in years)? __________ 
How many years have you been in college? __________ 
Are you male or female? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
Did your parents graduate from college? 
a. Yes, they both did.  
b. Yes, my mom did.  
c. Yes, my dad did. 
d. No, my parents did not graduate from college.  
e. Not sure. 
 
Are you a Political Science major? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Are you an International and Area Studies major? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Are you an international student? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the U.S. military? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background? 
a. Native American (American Indian) 
b. Asian 
c. Black (African American) 
d. Hispanic 
e. White 
f. Something else _________________________ (please specify) 
 
Next, I would like to ask you some questions about your political beliefs. 
With which political party do you most identify? 
a. Democratic 
b. Republican 
c. Independent 
d. Other Party _________________________ (please specify) 
 
Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that party? 
a. Completely 
b. Somewhat 
c. Slightly  
 
On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal 
to strongly conservative. With of the following best describes your views? 
a. Strongly liberal 
b. Liberal 
c. Slightly liberal 
d. Middle of the road 
e. Slightly conservative 
f. Conservative 
g. Strongly conservative 
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Now, I want to ask you some questions about nuclear weapons. 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme 
risk, how much risk do you believe nuclear weapons pose to human health, safety, 
or prosperity? 
             No Risk                              Extreme Risk 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all likely and ten means 
extremely likely, please assess the likelihood that the following countries will 
attack the U.S. with a nuclear weapon in the next 10 years. 
                        Not at all likely                         Extremely likely 
China 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Iran 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
North Korea 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Russia 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means limited damage and ten means 
catastrophic damage, please assess the likely consequences of a nuclear attack on 
the U.S. from the following countries in the next 10 years.  
                        Limited damage                  Catastrophic damage 
China 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Iran 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
North Korea 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Russia 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
When making decisions about how to protect the U.S., policymakers are forced to 
prepare for two types of events: high consequence but low probability events (like 
a nuclear or terrorist attack) and low consequence but high probability events (like 
everyday criminal acts). If you were given 100 hours and asked to allocate the 
appropriate amount of time to preparing for each type of event, how would you 
allocate your time (total hours should add up to 100)? 
High consequence but low probability events (such as nuclear or terrorist 
attacks): __________ (hours) 
Low consequence but high probability events (such as everyday crime): 
__________ (hours) 
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Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten 
means extremely important, how important is it for the U.S. to retain nuclear 
weapons today?  
             Not at all important Extremely important 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all effective and ten 
means extremely effective, how effective do you believe U.S. nuclear weapons are 
for the following: 
                                                      Not at all effective            Extremely effective 
Preventing other countries from 
using nuclear weapons against 
the U.S. today? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Preventing other countries from 
providing nuclear weapons or 
nuclear materials to terrorists 
today? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Preventing other countries from 
using chemical or biological 
weapons against the U.S. 
today? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Preventing terrorist groups from 
using nuclear weapons against 
the U.S. today? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Preventing terrorist groups from 
using chemical or biological 
weapons against the U.S. 
today? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Using a “feeling thermometer” that ranges from 0 degrees to 100 degrees, please 
indicate how you feel about the government in the following countries. As you do 
so, keep the following key in mind:  
§ Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel 
favorable and warm toward that government. 
§ Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel 
favorable toward the government and that you don't care too much for 
that government. 
§ You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel 
particularly warm or cold toward that government. 
The government in China: __________ 
The government in India: __________ 
The government in North Korea: __________ 
The government in France: __________ 
The government in Iran: __________ 
The government in Russia: __________ 
The government in Australia: __________ 
 
Using the same “feeling thermometer” that ranges from 0 degrees to 100 degrees, 
please indicate how you feel about the people in the following countries. 
§ Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel 
favorable and warm toward the people. 
§ Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel 
favorable toward the people and that you don't care too much for that 
government. 
§ You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel 
particularly warm or cold toward the people. 
The people in China: __________ 
The people in India: __________ 
The people in North Korea: __________ 
The people in France: __________ 
The people in Iran: __________ 
The people in Russia: __________ 
The people in Australia: __________ 
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Next, I would like to you to respond to some statements that are designed to 
measure your beliefs about how the world should work. 
 
Please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one to 
seven, where one means strongly disagree and seven means strongly agree. 
Strongly  
disagree   
Strongly 
agree 
Even though allies are important, the U.S. must be 
willing to act alone to protect American interests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Like the citizens of many other countries, officials 
and citizens of the U.S., including members of the 
military, should be subject to criminal proceedings 
under the International Criminal Court in Europe. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unless directly attacked, we should not use U.S. 
military force without authorization from the 
United Nations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The U.S. can never entrust its security to 
international organizations such as the United 
Nations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The U.S. should agree to accept internationally 
established limits on the production of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gasses thought to 
cause global warming. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The U.S. must be willing to act preemptively by 
using military force against those that threaten us 
before they can attack us. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Again, please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one 
to seven, where one means strongly disagree and seven means strongly agree. 
Strongly 
disagree   
Strongly 
agree 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make 
the distribution of goods more equal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best 
for society to let people succeed or fail on their own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and 
do what you are told to do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of 
chance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Society works best if power is shared equally. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their 
own way in the world. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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It is our responsibility to reduce differences in 
income between the rich and the poor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is 
largely determined by forces beyond our control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict 
and swift punishment on those who break the rules. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most of the important things that take place in life 
happen by random chance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Society is in trouble because people do not obey 
those in authority. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Again, please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one 
to seven, where one means strongly disagree and seven means strongly agree. 
Strongly 
disagree   
Strongly 
agree 
Society should not punish murderers just to avenge 
the victims. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For a terrible crime, there should be a terrible 
punishment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We should show mercy to those who have done 
wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Those who hurt others deserve to be hurt in return. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Punishment should fit the crime. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In this section, I would like you to compare each of the two statements about 
international affairs and place a checkmark next to the statement that best 
describes your answer to the following questions.   
What is more important to you? 
a. ☐ Promoting human rights 
abroad …or… 
☐ Improving security at 
home 
b. ☐ Protecting American 
corporations …or… 
☐ Upholding international 
law 
c. ☐ Opening up trade with 
foreign countries …or… 
☐ Increasing American 
military might 
d. ☐ Restricting the flow of 
weapons of mass destruction …or… 
☐ Encouraging the spread of 
democracy abroad 
In your opinion, countries... 
a. ☐ Are inherently aggressive …or… ☐ Are inherently 
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cooperative 
b. ☐ Can often be persuaded by 
international organizations (like 
the United Nations) 
…or… ☐ Can only be persuaded by the use of force 
c. ☐ Should never trust other 
countries …or… 
☐ Should be able to trust 
other countries 
d. ☐ Should only use military 
force for defensive purposes …or… 
☐ Should be prepared to use 
military force for any 
purpose 
e. ☐ Should pay less attention to 
treaties and institutions …or… 
☐ Should pay less attention 
to power and arms races 
 
In your opinion, war...  
a. ☐ Usually occurs because 
different countries have 
different values 
…or… 
☐ Usually occurs because 
different countries have 
clashing interests 
b. ☐ Is usually unavoidable …or… ☐ Can usually be avoided 
c. ☐ Tends to make problems 
worse …or… 
☐ Often fulfills a useful 
purpose 
d. ☐ Is a legitimate way to settle 
disputes …or… 
☐ Should always be the last 
resort 
 
Now, I would like you to rank the following four statements in terms of which 
one most accurately describes you. A ranking of “1” means that statement best 
describes the way you look at the world and a ranking of “4” means that statement 
least describes the way that you look at the world. 
                                                                                                                    Rank 
1=Most Accurate 
4=Least Accurate 
I am more comfortable when I know who is, and who is not, a part of 
my group, and loyalty to the group is important to me. I prefer to 
know who is in charge and to have clear rules and procedures; those 
who are in charge should punish those who break the rules. I like to 
have my responsibilities clearly defined, and I believe people should 
be rewarded based on the position they hold and their competence. 
Most of the time, I trust those with authority and expertise to do what 
is right for society. 
 
Groups are not all that important to me. I prefer to make my own way 
in life without having to follow other peoples’ rules. Rewards in life 
should be based on initiative, skill, and hard work, even if that results 
in inequality. I respect people based on what they do, not the positions 
or titles they hold. I like relationships that are based on negotiated 
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“give and take,” rather than on status. Everyone benefits when 
individuals are allowed to compete. 
Society today is unfair and corrupt, and my most important 
contributions are made as a member of a group that promotes justice 
and equality. Within my group, everyone should play an equal role 
without differences in rank or authority. It is easy to lose track of what 
is important, so I have to keep a close eye on the actions of my group. 
It is not enough to provide equal opportunities; we also have to try to 
make outcomes more equal. 
 
Life is unpredictable and I have little control. I have to live by lots of 
rules, but I don’t get to make them. My fate in life is determined 
mostly by chance. I can’t become a member of the groups that make 
most of the important decisions affecting me. Getting along in life is 
largely a matter of doing the best I can with what comes my way, so I 
focus on taking care of myself and the people closest to me. 
 
 
In next part of the survey, I will give you some information about a fictional 
scenario that involves a military crisis between the U.S. and North Korea. 
Though the scenario is fictional, please read it carefully and imagine how you 
would feel if the events that are described were to happen in the near future.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCENERIO: The year is 2013. In an effort to assert his military prowess, Kim 
Jung Un—the newly appointed leader of North Korea—begins shelling Seoul (the 
capital of South Korea), bombing South Korean air bases, and invading South 
Korea. U.S. and South Korean forces slow the invasion and conduct airstrikes on 
military targets in North Korea using conventional munitions. Within a week, the 
North Korean invasion is reversed, and U.S. and South Korean ground forces 
regain South Korean territory and prepare to invade North Korea.  
 
Without warning, two advanced models of the Taepodong-2 missile are launched 
from North Korea. One strikes Honolulu, Hawaii with a nuclear explosion 
producing at least 40,000 fatalities and unknown numbers of injured and missing 
persons. U.S. naval facilities at Pearl Harbor are heavily damaged. The second 
North Korean missile is intercepted off the coast of Alaska and destroyed by U.S. 
missile defenses before it reaches its intended target of Seattle, Washington. 
Chinese and Russian nuclear forces are brought to their highest levels of alert, and 
both countries call on all parties to cease hostilities. North Korea warns that if 
American and South Korean forces invade North Korea, it will launch additional 
nuclear missile strikes against cities in the United States and South Korea. 
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As you think about the events depicted in the aforementioned scenario, please 
write down the first three feelings that come to mind: 
1. ______________________________ 
2. ______________________________ 
3. ______________________________ 
 
Now I am going to give you a list of feelings. Using a scale from zero to ten, 
where zero means not at all and ten means extremely, please indicate how you 
feel as you continue to think about the events depicted in the aforementioned 
scenario. 
                         Not at all                                    Extremely 
Mad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Scared 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sorrowful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Helpless 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Fearful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Powerless 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Heartbroken 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enraged 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Hopeless 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Afraid 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Next, I would like you to rank some feelings in terms of which one most 
accurately describes how you feel as you continue to think about events depicted 
in the aforementioned scenario. A ranking of “1” means that feeling best 
describes how you feel and a ranking of “4” means that feeling least describes 
how you feel when thinking about the events depicted in the aforementioned 
scenario. 
                                   Rank 
1=Most Accurate 
4=Least Accurate 
Sad  
Scared  
Angry  
Helpless  
 
 
Now, I am going to list several actions that the United States could pursue in 
response to the aforementioned scenario. Though this list is not exclusive and you 
might not agree completely with any one of the options, please indicate which 
course of action you favor the most. 
a. Diplomacy and negotiations: Demand an immediate cease-fire and warn 
that further nuclear attacks from North Korea will result in full-scale U.S. 
nuclear retaliation. 
b. Airstrikes using conventional armaments: Conduct air attacks using 
precision guided conventional munitions against known and suspected 
nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North Korea. 
c. Invasion using conventional armaments: Conduct air, land, and sea attacks 
against North Korea using conventional armaments against known and 
suspected nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North Korea. 
d. Retaliation using nuclear weapons: Conduct nuclear strikes against North 
Korea using U.S. intercontinental ballistic and cruise missiles against 
known and suspected nuclear facilities and missile launch sites in North 
Korea. 
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Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all confident and ten 
means extremely confident, how confident are you that the option you selected in 
the previous question is the best possible course of action under these 
circumstances? 
             Not at all confident Extremely confident 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all likely and ten means 
extremely likely, please assess the likelihood that the aforementioned scenario 
(where North Korea uses a nuclear weapon against the U.S.) will occur in the next 
10 years. 
             Not at all likely Extremely likely 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Lastly, would you, in exchange for extra credit in this class, be willing to 
participate in a group discussion about the topics mentioned in this survey? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
If yes, please write your email address below so that I can contact you with 
further details. Any email address will work, as long as you check it regularly. 
 
Email address: ______________________________________ 
 
